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Taking Data 
Michael C. Pollack† 
Technological development has created new forms of information, altered ex-
pectations of privacy, and given law enforcement more tools to examine that infor-
mation and intrude on that privacy. One crucial facet of these changes involves in-
ternet service providers (ISPs): as people expose more of their lives to their ISPs—
all the websites they visit, people they communicate with, emails they send, files 
they store, and more—law enforcement efforts to access that data become more and 
more common. But scholars and policymakers alike recognize that the existing 
statutory frameworks governing those efforts are based on obsolete technology and 
strike balances that are difficult to justify and that are both over- and underprotec-
tive of privacy. 
This Article proposes a new approach to regulating government investiga-
tions of data that has been shared with ISPs—one that is inspired by a legal tool 
designed to achieve the very balance between public benefits and private burdens 
that has thus far proven elusive. This tool is the Takings Clause. Under the  
Takings Clause, the government can acquire private property, including intangible 
and intellectual property, but this wide-ranging power is disciplined by the re-
quirement that the government pursue a public purpose and pay just compensa-
tion for the property it takes. This Article argues that adapting these features of the 
takings framework to govern the investigation of ISP-held data would be feasible, 
theoretically and doctrinally sound, and normatively desirable. 
In making this argument, this Article addresses one of the primary problems 
with the various existing mechanisms by which government conducts 
investigations online, which is that the costs of diminished privacy fall on the 
civilian targets of those investigations. The result is that law enforcement does not 
adequately consider these costs when making investigation decisions. Acquiring 
information under a takings-inspired regime, by contrast, would trigger a 
requirement to compensate the person whose privacy has been diminished and 
thus impose a direct cost on the government entity conducting the investigation. 
This obligation to pay would force the investigating entity to be more thoughtful 
 
 † Assistant Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I am grateful to 
Miriam Baer, William Baude, Maureen Brady, Christopher Buccafusco, David Carlson, 
Nestor Davidson, Myriam Gilles, Ben Grunwald, Daniel Hemel, Michael Herz, Orin 
Kerr, Timothy Mulvaney, Luke Norris, John Rappaport, Shelley Ross Saxer, Ric 
Simmons, Edward Stein, James Stern, Stewart Sterk, Lior Strahilevitz, Matthew 
Tokson, Felix Wu, Stephen Yelderman, and participants in the AALS New Voices in 
Property Law Workshop, Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop, Law and Society Annual 
Meeting, Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty Forum at the University of Richmond Law School, 
and Southeastern Association of Law Schools New Scholars Workshop for their 
guidance, suggestions, comments, and critiques. I thank the Stephen B. Siegel Program 
in Real Estate Law for research support. 
78 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:77 
	
about which investigations are the highest priorities, most likely to yield valuable 
information, and most tailored to achieve their purposes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 16, 2016, a federal court ordered Apple to “as-
sist law enforcement agents in enabling the search” of an iPhone 
that had been lawfully seized during the investigation into a 
mass shooting in San Bernardino, California.1 Though this was 
not the first time that federal law enforcement had attempted to 
compel Apple to unlock an iPhone seized during the course of a 
criminal investigation, it was one of the first times that Apple 
resisted.2 CEO Tim Cook took the matter public, issuing a 
statement that expressed Apple’s opposition to the court’s order 
and called for “public discussion” about the importance of data 
security.3 
Sure enough, people started to pay attention.4 Indeed, the 
incident fit into and catalyzed a broader conversation about the 
 
 1 Order Compelling Apple, Inc to Assist Agents in Search, In re Search of an Apple 
iPhone Seized during Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California 
License Plate 35KGD203, No 15-0451, *1 (CD Cal filed Feb 16, 2016) (available on 
Westlaw at 2016 WL 618401). 
 2 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc to Assist in the Execution of a Search War-
rant Issued by This Court, 149 F Supp 3d 341, 346–47 (EDNY 2016); Steven R. Morrison, 
Breaking iPhones under CALEA and the All Writs Act: Why the Government Was (Most-
ly) Right, 38 Cardozo L Rev 2039, 2041 (2017). 
 3 Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers (Apple, Feb 16, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/68X7-SDLL. 
 4 That is not to say that their positions, however sincerely taken, were entirely 
consistent. Public opinion polls showed differing levels of support for Apple’s position 
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relationship among law enforcement, public safety, new 
technology, and privacy, all of which became front-page news.5 
One federal judge emphasized that the need for such a 
discussion “becomes more pressing daily, as the tide of 
technological advance flows ever farther past the boundaries of 
what seemed possible even a few decades ago.”6 Politicians and 
industry groups deployed, presidential candidates took 
positions, and even the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights weighed in.7 
This larger effort to adapt privacy and law enforcement to 
new technology continues, but unfortunately in somewhat 
schizophrenic fashion. For example, in a “rare and remarkable 
display” of both bipartisanship and action, the House of 
Representatives has thrice passed the Email Privacy Act (EPA), 
a bill designed to increase the protection afforded to the content 
of emails stored by internet service providers (ISPs), with 
unanimous or near-unanimous support.8 But the bill has never 
 
and the government’s efforts, and some polls even showed some irreconcilable beliefs—
that Apple was right to resist the government but that the government should be able to 
look at cell phone data “to protect against terror threats.” Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Apple vs. 
FBI: What the Polls Are Saying—Updated (Fortune, Feb 23, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/NP9S-57GE. 
 5 See, for example, Michael D. Shear, In Nod to Law Enforcement in Apple Case, 
Obama Ends Attempt to Straddle Privacy Divide (NY Times, Feb 19, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/PU7W-LJ4C; Todd C. Frankel and Ellen Nakashima, Showdown over 
iPhone Reignites the Debate around Privacy (Wash Post, Feb 19, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/8PN7-YVWH. See also Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls: A 
Reunified Theory of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Jurisprudence, 37 Cardozo L Rev 185, 
247 (2015). 
 6 In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc to Assist, 149 F Supp 3d at 376.  
 7 See, for example, Sam Thielman and Danny Yadron, Crunch Time for Apple as It 
Prepares for Face-Off with FBI (The Guardian, Feb 27, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DQK7-23BQ. For example, then-candidate Donald Trump called in  
February 2016 for a “[b]oycott [of] all Apple products until such time as Apple gives cell-
phone info to authorities regarding radical Islamic terrorist couple from Cal.” 
@realDonaldTrump (Twitter, Feb 19, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/PZ69-SCUT. See 
also Press Release, United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, 
Apple-FBI Case Could Have Serious Global Ramifications for Human Rights: Zeid 
(United Nations Human Rights, Mar 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/HLY5-4W2F. 
 8 Editorial, The House Votes Unanimously to Strengthen Email Privacy (NY 
Times, Apr 29, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/732B-6LBQ. The first time the bill 
passed, in April 2016, it did so on a unanimous recorded vote. Email Privacy Act, HR 
699, 114th Cong, 2d Sess, in 162 Cong Rec H 2035 (daily ed Apr 27, 2016). The second 
time the bill passed, in February 2017, it did so on a voice vote. Email Privacy Act, HR 
387, 115th Cong, 1st Sess, in 163 Cong Rec H 992 (daily ed Feb 6, 2017). The third time 
the bill passed, in May 2018, it did so as an amendment to the annual National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), Pub L No 115-232, 132 Stat 1636 (2018), which passed the 
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come to a vote in the Senate,9 and in the wake of a different 
mass shooting in Orlando, the Senate actually considered 
(though ultimately rejected) a proposal to decrease the level of 
protection afforded to internet browsing history and information 
like email addresses with which a person has communicated.10 
Of course, to recount examples like these is not to indict 
Congress for being torn—or, perhaps, even “paralyzed.”11 Indeed, 
as understandable as the impulse to protect privacy from new 
technology is, that impulse necessarily sits in tension with legit-
imate law enforcement and public safety considerations that 
have their own strong political salience.12 But lurching between 
increasing and decreasing electronic privacy in response to 
whatever the latest headlines may prompt is a recipe for bad 
policy—in both directions.13 These kinds of binary reactions are 
apt to result in a system that is both under- and overprotective 
of privacy relative to real law enforcement needs.14 And yet it is 
“apparent to everyone involved” that our laws in this area are 
 
House on a vote of 351 to 66. NDAA, HR 5515, 115th Cong, 2d Sess, in 164 Cong Rec H 
4721 (daily ed May, 24, 2018).  
 9 On the demise of HR 699, see Erin Kelly, Senate Derails Bill to Rein in Email 
Surveillance (USA Today, June 9, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/ZDG4-PHY2. HR 
387 languishes in committee in the Senate. See All Actions H.R.699—114th Congress 
(2015–2016) (Library of Congress, Apr 28, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/N3CB-
ALSP. Finally, when the Senate took up the NDAA in 2018, it stripped out the language 
containing the Email Privacy Act. See NDAA, HR 5515, 115th Cong, 2d Sess, in 164 
Cong Rec S 3961 (daily ed June 18, 2018). 
 10 See Karoun Demirjian, After Orlando, Senate Rejects Plan to Allow FBI Web 
Searches without Court Order (Wash Post, June 22, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/UFJ7-UNEY. 
 11 Barry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing without Permission 238 (Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux 2017). 
 12 See id at 237. See also William Baude and James Y. Stern, The Positive Law 
Model of the Fourth Amendment, 129 Harv L Rev 1821, 1857 (2016) (“[W]hat is notable 
about privacy is that it is also not obvious that it is an unalloyed good. And indeed some-
times it is affirmatively bad.”). 
 13 See Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 
102 Minn L Rev 577, 632–33 (2017) (“Legislative measures addressing perceived short-
comings in data privacy are almost universally perceived as outdated, incomplete, insuf-
ficiently rigorous, or some combination of the three. . . . Instead, when Congress has  
acted at all, it has done so piecemeal, through a series of narrowly targeted statutes.”). 
 14 As President Barack Obama put it,  
You cannot take an absolutist view on [encryption]. If your view is strong en-
cryption no matter what and we can and should create black boxes, that does 
not strike the balance that we’ve lived with for 200 or 300 years. And it’s fet-
ishizing our phones above every other value. That can’t be the right answer. 
Sam Machkovech, Obama Weighs in on Apple v. FBI: “You Can’t Take an Absolutist 
View” (Ars Technica, Mar 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/DB6K-PCUU. 
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obsolete or inadequate, and that how to update those statutes 
remains a crucial question in desperate need of an answer.15 
This Article looks beyond these unsatisfactory either/or stat-
utory proposals to identify and evaluate an underappreciated  
way in which government might be channeled when it seeks ac-
cess to electronic data. This solution is not simply a variation on 
the usual themes of toggling protection up or down by requiring 
a warrant, eliminating an exception, creating a new exception, 
or the like. Instead, it is a statute inspired by an existing gov-
ernmental power that has gone untapped in this arena—one 
that, in practice, contains features that are geared toward rela-
tively more finely calibrated governmental action and that are 
designed to balance public benefits with private burdens: the 
power of eminent domain.16 The Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause provides that government may “take[ ]” private property 
“for public use” so long as “just compensation” is rendered to the 
dispossessed former property owner.17 While the most salient 
example of property subject to a taking is real property, the 
courts have made clear that personal property—including pri-
vate papers, such as President Richard Nixon’s White House 
papers18—and intellectual property are equally within the ambit 
of the Takings Clause.19 This Article’s argument is thus a simple 
one: if the government wants data stored on a server at Google, 
for example, it should be required to “take” it.20 
First, as this Article argues in more detail below, a takings-
inspired statute that authorized the government to acquire data 
 
 15 Friedman, Unwarranted at 238 (cited in note 11). See also Baude and Stern, 129 
Harv L Rev at 1853 (cited in note 12); Fred H. Cate and Stephen A. Saltzburg, Should Law 
Enforcement Have to Get a Warrant to Obtain Stored Emails? (Wall St J, May 22, 2016), 
online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/should-law-enforcement-have-to-get-a-warrant-to-
obtain-stored-emails-1463968801 (visited Oct 20, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 16 See Armstrong v United States, 364 US 40, 49 (1960) (“The Fifth Amendment’s 
guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compen-
sation was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”). 
 17 US Const Amend V. 
 18 See Nixon v United States, 978 F2d 1269, 1287 (DC Cir 1992). 
 19 See Horne v Department of Agriculture, 135 S Ct 2419, 2426 (2015) (holding that 
the Takings Clause “protects ‘private property’ without any distinction between different 
types,” and explaining that “[t]he Government has a categorical duty to pay just 
compensation when it takes your car, just as when it takes your home”); Ruckelshaus v 
Monsanto Co, 467 US 986, 1003–04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets are protected by 
the Takings Clause). 
 20 The claim here is not that the Fifth Amendment presently requires the govern-
ment to use its takings power in this context but rather that a statutory regime inspired 
by the takings power would be a feasible and beneficial innovation. 
82 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:77 
	
held by third parties like ISPs for law enforcement purposes 
would be both doctrinally and theoretically sound, doing little 
violence to the law of takings, the law of criminal procedure, and 
theories of property law more broadly.21 Once guided by legisla-
tion, the government would do what it already does for ordinary 
takings for land acquisition, development, private sector regula-
tion, and more: identify the property in question, file a declara-
tion of a taking of that property in federal court, and pay the re-
quired compensation. In making this argument, this Article 
contributes a new perspective on how private data might be un-
derstood as property or property-like and demonstrates that the 
concerns raised by scholars who resist such property-based per-
spectives are either misplaced or avoidable.22 
The second piece of the Article is more normative. For those 
who might accept a certain degree of propertizing with respect 
to private data, fears may linger about the implications of such a 
move in the law enforcement context. This Article shows not  
only that there is little to fear but that there is in fact much to 
be gained.23 If the government were forced to investigate in ac-
cordance with a takings-style regime, it would have to pay for 
the data it wants, publicly account for those payments, and do so 
while embracing the exercise of one of the most politically un-
popular governmental powers. Acquiring a warrant is often 
quite cheap; buying actual data can be costly.24 And in this  
 
 21 See Part II. 
 22 See Part II.B. 
 23 In a 2004 article, Professor Paul Schwartz asserted in passing that “law en-
forcement access to personal data should not be structured through recourse to a 
propertized model” and that “the government’s acquisition and use of personal data 
should not be subject to eminent domain or Takings Clause jurisprudence.” Paul M. 
Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 Harv L Rev 2056, 2096 (2004). I 
argue that there is little theoretical, doctrinal, or normative reason why either of these 
claims is right. See Part II.B (making theoretical and doctrinal arguments); Part III.A 
(making normative arguments). 
 24 See Part III.B. Compare Missouri v McNeely, 569 US 141, 154–55 (2013) (observ-
ing that states have “streamline[d] the warrant process” and that technology also “al-
low[s] for the more expeditious processing of warrant applications” by remote means, 
including “telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, 
and video conferencing”); FRCrP 41(d)(3) (providing that a magistrate judge may issue a 
warrant “based on information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic 
means”); Friedman, Unwarranted at 138 (cited in note 11) (describing the ease of acquir-
ing warrants via telephone or computer); Andrew H. Bean, Swearing by New Technology: 
Strengthening the Fourth Amendment by Utilizing Modern Warrant Technology while 
Satisfying the Oath or Affirmation Clause, 2014 BYU L Rev 927, 935–37 (observing that 
delays in the warrant procurement process have been drastically reduced by modern 
modes of communication), with Leslie R. Masterson and Jeremy R. Wallace, The Manson 
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context, making government bear those costs has the potential 
to substantially change government behavior. 
As things stand now, the costs of diminished privacy fall on 
the civilian targets of investigations: the citizens or private enti-
ties whose privacy is intruded on. Those costs are significant,25 
but they are generally not borne by the government, which 
means that they are generally not considered by the government 
when it makes investigatory decisions. Employing a takings-
based approach, by contrast, would house the task of balancing 
the costs and benefits of privacy invasions for law enforcement 
purposes within entities actually responsible for both bearing 
those costs and receiving those benefits. The government would 
thus be forced to internalize the real privacy-related externali-
ties generated by its investigative efforts and to therefore be 
more thoughtful about prioritizing those efforts and tailoring 
their scope. Such an approach would also provide finer calibra-
tion, as I note above, because these judgments would be made at 
the retail level after consideration of the specific need for (and 
expected benefits of) a particular intrusion, rather than resolved 
in reactive, one-size-fits-all legislative enactments. 
While scholars such as Professor Daryl Levinson have cast 
some doubt on the notion that government can be made to 
change its behavior in this manner,26 this Article meets that 
 
Tapes: Evidence of Murder in Bankruptcy Court, 36 Am Bankr Inst J 12, 13 (Nov 2017) 
(noting that tapes of an interview conducted with Charles Denton Watson, an associate 
of mass murderer Charles Manson, sold for $48,000); Jennifer R. Williams, Beyond  
Nixon: The Application of the Takings Clause to the Papers of Constitutional Officehold-
ers, 71 Wash U L Q 871, 871 (1993) (noting that the Watergate tapes were valued at $2.5 
million and that “prices for a relatively routine letter or memorandum from President 
Nixon’s office range from $500 to $5,000”); Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2056 n 1 (cited 
in note 23) (noting that marketers are estimated to digest $75 billion of personal infor-
mation each year). Of course, relative to warrantless searches, searches predicated on 
warrants are more costly for law enforcement officers. See Max Minzner, Putting Proba-
bility Back into Probable Cause, 87 Tex L Rev 913, 926 (2009) (“Searches pursuant to a 
warrant are more expensive for law enforcement than those without warrants.”). See 
also Miriam H. Baer, Pricing the Fourth Amendment, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev 1103, 1134 
(2017). My point is that, in absolute terms, the costs of procuring warrants are low and 
the costs of acquiring property are likely to be at least somewhat higher. 
 25 See Friedman, Unwarranted at 142 (cited in note 11) (noting the lack of trust in 
the police and feelings of “anger,” “fright,” and “humiliation”). See also Orin S. Kerr, An 
Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U Pa L Rev 591, 595 (2016) 
(noting that investigatory techniques “impose societal costs in the form of civil liberties 
violated, property destroyed, and peace and stability disrupted”). 
 26 Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation 
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U Chi L Rev 345, 359 (2000) (arguing that various barriers 
prevent government agents from responding to pecuniary incentives). 
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objection by drawing on evidence that law enforcement actors in 
fact are generally attuned to cost and by arguing that financial 
costs are particularly likely to translate into salient political and 
bureaucratic costs under the specific regime I propose.27 So, far 
from handing the government the ability to blow a server-farm–
sized hole in privacy, taking data has the potential to decrease 
the amount of data sought by the government and to 
consequently increase the data privacy enjoyed by American 
citizens.28 At a minimum, this approach could better optimize 
the levels of both privacy and law enforcement intrusions. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I sets out the laws 
that presently shape the government’s investigatory power in 
this arena—the Fourth Amendment,29 the All Writs Act30 (AWA), 
and the Stored Communications Act31 (SCA)—as well as new 
proposals like the EPA.32 It explores the ways in which each one 
is unequal to the moment, underprotective of privacy in favor of 
law enforcement, overprotective of privacy at the expense of law 
enforcement, or some combination of the three. Part II makes 
the doctrinal and theoretical case for taking data instead. It 
explains the operation of the Takings Clause, reveals how a 
takings-inspired approach could be employed in the law 
enforcement context, and fleshes out how private data may be 
thought of in property-like terms. To that end, it presents a 
model statutory framework that the government could use to 
acquire data in the possession of ISPs or other cloud computing 
 
 27 See Part III.A. 
 28 This proposal thus shares a common root with Professor Miriam Baer’s recent 
proposal that local police departments pay a fee to a federal agency reflecting the volume 
and potential harm of their search activity. Baer, 58 Wm & Mary L Rev at 1137 (cited in 
note 24). It also fits with a piece of Professors Bernard Harcourt and Tracey Meares’s 
randomized search proposal, in which people would be compensated for police encounters 
that are ultimately determined to be unreasonable. Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. 
Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, 78 U Chi L Rev 809, 817, 868–70 
(2011). Like these scholars, I think there is much potential in corrective pricing schemes, 
but this Article seeks to further develop this sort of intervention by drawing attention to 
property law’s potential in this arena, and to the property-like nature of private data, by 
leveraging this distinct property-based framework and by proposing a scheme that can 
offer even more fine-grained pricing and thus achieve more fine-tuned outcomes. For an-
other recent example of a property law contribution to the Fourth Amendment arena and 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, see generally Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the 
Fourth Amendment: Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 Yale L J 946 (2016). 
 29 US Const Amend IV. 
 30 28 USC § 1651. 
 31 Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848 (1986), codified as amended at 18 USC § 2701 et seq. 
 32 Email Privacy Act, HR 387, 115th Cong, 1st Sess, in 163 Cong Rec H 992 (daily 
ed Feb 6, 2017). 
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services like Google.33 Part III evaluates that framework 
normatively, offers a more fulsome defense of it, and unpacks its 
potential as a viable way to balance privacy and security in a 
climate of rapidly transforming technology. 
I.  THE EXISTING TOOLBOX FOR DATA SEARCHES 
The government’s ability to examine data held by ISPs 
presently comprises three basic pieces. The first piece consists of 
its traditional powers as cabined by the Fourth Amendment; the 
second, its abilities under the 1789 All Writs Act; and the third, 
its options under the 1986 Stored Communications Act. This 
Part sets out the metes and bounds of these three mechanisms, 
discusses their limitations, and closes by discussing some recent 
proposals for reforms and additions. 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” of one’s “person[ ], houses, papers, and effects” and 
provides that a warrant for such a search may be issued by a 
neutral magistrate upon a showing of “probable cause.”34 
Current doctrine provides that the government conducts a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if it 
violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”35 Data 
and electronic information are just as susceptible to this form of 
investigation as any other kind of evidence. Accordingly, if the 
government wishes to access a person’s data, it may do so by 
getting a warrant supported by probable cause or by availing 
itself of one of the doctrinal exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.36 
The ordinary regime for investigatory searches thus maps, 
at least as a first cut, onto the world of ISP-held data. But it 
does so in ways that are ultimately not particularly protective of 
privacy. This is largely because the Supreme Court has long 
held in a variety of contexts that a person has no “reasonable 
 
 33 For ease of reference, this Article simply refers to ISPs as a catchall going  
forward. 
 34 US Const Amend IV. 
 35 Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan concurring). 
 36 See Kentucky v King, 563 US 452, 459 (2011) (noting that “a warrant must 
generally be secured” but that, because the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‘reasonableness[,]’ . . . the warrant requirement is subject to certain 
reasonable exceptions”). 
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expectation of privacy” in information she “voluntarily con-
vey[s]” to a third party.37 As a result, under this “third-party 
doctrine,” once information is shared with a third party—even 
when it is shared “on the assumption that it will be used only for 
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party 
will not be betrayed”—it is no longer protected by the terms of 
the Fourth Amendment.38 To choose a case with some factual 
similarities to the problems this Article tackles, the Court held 
in Smith v Maryland39 that a person has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the numbers he dials on his telephone because 
he voluntarily “convey[s] that number to the telephone  
company.”40 Similarly, it would appear that at least some infor-
mation a person communicates to her ISP—her network ad-
dress, sites visited, individuals emailed, and the like—is unpro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment.41 This is good news for the 
government, which accordingly does not need a warrant for such 
information, but potentially distressing news for some citizens. 
Giving voice to the latter view, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has 
cautioned that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”—precisely be-
cause, at least to her mind, “[t]his approach is ill suited to the 
 
 37 United States v Miller, 425 US 435, 442 (1976). See also Smith v Maryland, 442 
US 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
 38 Miller, 425 US at 443. See, for example, California v Greenwood, 486 US 35, 40–
41 (1988) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the street and 
“readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public”) (citations omitted); California v Ciraolo, 476 US 207, 213–14 (1986); Katz, 389 
US at 351. 
 39 442 US 735 (1979). 
 40 Id at 743. 
 41 See, for example, United States v Christie, 624 F3d 558, 573–74 (3d Cir 2010) 
(holding that an IP address is not protected); United States v Forrester, 512 F3d 500, 
509–11 (9th Cir 2008) (sites visited and individuals emailed); United States v Lifshitz, 
369 F3d 173, 190 (2d Cir 2004) (internet transmissions that have already arrived). 
Exactly where the line is drawn, particularly with respect to content information, has 
proven murky, though the weight of authority suggests that law enforcement needs a 
warrant to access the content of email communication. See, for example, United States v 
Warshak, 631 F3d 266, 288 (6th Cir 2010) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires 
the government to obtain a warrant in order to access stored email content); Orin S. 
Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to 
Amending It, 72 Geo Wash L Rev 1208, 1210–11 (2004) (“It is too early to tell whether 
courts will adopt the same rationale for content information, such as e-mails. . . . Either 
way, it remains unclear today whether files held by ISPs on behalf of their users can 
retain a Fourth Amendment ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”). 
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digital age. . . . I for one doubt that people would accept without 
complaint the warrantless disclosure to the government of a list 
of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or 
year.”42 
Even so, the Court has thus far declined invitations to  
revisit wholesale the third-party doctrine. In its recent decision 
in Carpenter v United States,43 the Court considered whether 
records of cell-site location information in the possession of a 
wireless carrier were protected by the Fourth Amendment.44 And 
while the Court held that they were so protected, it expressly 
did “not disturb” Smith and its third-party doctrine progeny.45 
Rather, it emphasized how “narrow” its conclusion was and how 
substantially that conclusion turned on the fact that cell-site lo-
cation information is “unique” in terms of its power to reveal an 
“exhaustive chronicle” of a person’s daily life and its intimate 
details.46 There is a “world of difference,” the Court said, be-
tween such information and everything else ordinarily—and 
still—subject to the third-party doctrine.47 Accordingly, the pri-
vacy gap created by the third-party doctrine is likely to remain 
with us for some time—even if subject to ad hoc clawbacks, such 
as Carpenter, or other efforts to reshape it from time to time.48 
 
 42 United States v Jones, 565 US 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor concurring). 
 43 138 S Ct 2206 (2018). 
 44 Id at 2211. 
 45 Id at 2220. 
 46 Id at 2219, 2220. See also id at 2216 (calling cell-site records “qualitatively dif-
ferent” than run-of-the-mill information subject to the third-party doctrine); id at 2217 
(emphasizing that time-stamped cell-site location information provides an especially “in-
timate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but 
through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’”), 
quoting Jones, 565 US at 415 (Sotomayor concurring); Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2218 
(pointing out that cell-site location information allows the government to “travel back in 
time to retrace a person’s whereabouts”); id at 2220 (describing the power of cell-site lo-
cation information to provide a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence com-
piled every day, every moment, over several years”); id at 2222 (calling cell-site location 
information “an entirely different species” of record). Indeed, the Court was so taken 
with the distinct nature of cell-site location information that it used the word “chronicle” 
to illustrate that information’s power five times in its relatively short opinion. Id at 
2211, 2216, 2219, 2220. 
 47 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2219. 
 48 See id at 2224, 2232 (Kennedy dissenting) (criticizing, on behalf of three justices, 
the Court’s “illogical” line drawing around cell-site location information and arguing in 
favor of a straightforward application of Smith and the third-party doctrine rather than 
“category-by-category balancing”); Baude and Stern, 129 Harv L Rev at 1872 (cited in 
note 12) (arguing that “it is hard to imagine abandoning the third-party doctrine alto-
gether”); Erin Murphy, The Case against the Case for Third-Party Doctrine: A Response 
to Epstein and Kerr, 24 Berkeley Tech L J 1239, 1252–53 (2009) (suggesting a “sliding 
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Moreover, under the umbrella of another exception to the 
warrant requirement, the government can sometimes access 
electronically transmitted and remotely stored information with 
just a subpoena served on the third-party possessor of that in-
formation (such as an ISP)49 even though such subpoenas do not 
require probable cause and instead are evaluated under a much 
less searching standard akin to  reasonableness.50 The process of 
issuing a subpoena is also strikingly simple for the government 
and features few, if any, checks.51 To take the example of a 
grand jury subpoena, a prosecutor drafts the subpoena herself;52 
can compel the production of any “books, papers, documents,  
 
scale of protections” that could turn on a “hierarchy of disclosures” to third parties and 
on the disclosures’ degrees of voluntariness). But see Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2262–64 
(Gorsuch dissenting) (criticizing the third-party doctrine as well as Katz itself). 
 49 See Friedman, Unwarranted at 234 (cited in note 11) (“If the government wants 
it, the Supreme Court says, it need only subpoena it from whoever happens to be holding 
it. No warrant is needed and no probable cause required, thank you very much.”); Kerr, 
72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1211–12 (cited in note 41): 
[T]he Fourth Amendment generally allows the government to issue a grand  
jury subpoena compelling the disclosure of information and property, even if it 
is protected by a Fourth Amendment “reasonable expectation of privacy.” . . . 
[S]o long as the third party is in possession of the target’s materials, the gov-
ernment may subpoena the materials from the third party without first obtain-
ing a warrant based on probable cause. 
 In Carpenter, the Court arguably muddied the waters relating to the government’s 
subpoena power, saying, on the one hand, that it “has never held that the Government 
may subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy” and, on the other, that “[t]he Government will be able to use subpoenas 
to acquire records in the overwhelming majority of investigations.” Carpenter, 138 S Ct 
at 2221, 2222. Time will tell how dramatic a shift this proves to be. See id at 2255 (Alito 
dissenting) (noting that the only reason the Court, in the majority’s words, “has never 
held that the Government may subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy” is that, until the Carpenter decision, “defend-
ants categorically had no” protected interest in such records); Orin Kerr, Does Carpenter 
Revolutionize the Law of Subpoenas? (Lawfare, June 26, 2018), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C28R-UY27 (suggesting that Carpenter will ultimately not have a “major 
impact” on subpoenas). 
 50 See United States v R. Enterprises, Inc, 498 US 292, 297 (1991) (“[T]he Govern-
ment cannot be required to justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting 
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause because the very purpose of requesting 
the information is to ascertain whether probable cause exists.”); See v City of Seattle, 387 
US 541, 544–45 (1967) (holding that only “rather minimal limitations” are constitution-
ally required “in the case of investigative entry upon commercial establishments” and 
that an administrative agency may subpoena records consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment so long as the subpoena is “sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, 
and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome”). 
 51 Andrew E. Taslitz and Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Pro-
tect Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 Am U L Rev 195, 199 (2014). 
 52 FRCrP 17(a). 
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data, or other objects” she designates;53 and can do so “even just 
because [she] wants assurance that [the law] is not” being vio-
lated.54 The recipient of such a subpoena—here, the ISP—
generally has little standing to challenge that subpoena, and 
even the types of objections that a recipient is permitted to raise 
usually fail.55 
Finally, in addition to these exceptions to the protection of-
fered by the Fourth Amendment, the fact remains that the 
Fourth Amendment—even when it does apply—is not particu-
larly effective at disciplining law enforcement or protecting pri-
vacy. This is because there are often no real penalties attached 
to its violation. The central penalty is the exclusion from trial of 
evidence unlawfully collected, but even when that penalty ap-
plies, its efficacy as a deterrent for law enforcement agencies or 
for individual officers is, as many scholars have long argued, 
highly questionable.56 Moreover, the exclusionary rule is riddled 
 
 53 FRCrP 17(c)(1). 
 54 United States v Morton Salt Co, 338 US 632, 643 (1950). See also R. Enterprises, 
498 US at 297 (explaining that the purpose of a subpoena is to permit a grand jury “to 
inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has 
identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred”). 
 55 See United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 345 (1974) (stating that a grand jury 
witness “is not entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy . . . to challenge 
the authority of the court or of the grand jury or to set limits to the investigation that the 
grand jury may conduct”), quoting Blair v United States, 250 US 273, 282 (1919) (quota-
tion marks omitted); Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DePaul L Rev 
805, 811 (2005). 
 56 See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants  
Seriously, 106 Nw U L Rev 1609, 1622 (2012) (“To say that the exclusionary rule is a 
failure is to risk hyperbole and understatement at the same time.”); id at 1625: 
The issue is straightforward: the ostensible purpose of the exclusionary rule is 
to deter police misconduct, but the mechanism is a lost conviction. The evi-
dence and the literature suggest that convictions are low on the list of things 
police are rewarded or punished for. Police care about arrests, not convictions. 
See also Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U 
Chi L Rev 665, 755 (1970): 
As a device for directly deterring illegal searches and seizures by the police, the 
exclusionary rule is a failure. There is no reason to expect the rule to have any 
direct effect on the overwhelming majority of police conduct that is not meant 
to result in prosecutions, and there is hardly any evidence that the rule exerts 
any deterrent effect on the small fraction of law enforcement activity that is 
aimed at prosecution. 
See also Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 
U Ill L Rev 363, 369, 381 (noting that “virtually all the studies [ ] suggest that, for many 
police officers, concern over the [exclusionary] rule is not a significant influence when 
contemplating a search or seizure,” and likewise concluding that “exclusion is not a 
strong behavior-shaping mechanism in the typical search and seizure setting”); id at 
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with exceptions of its own that further erode its disciplinary po-
tential.57 But even if the exclusionary rule were more solid, it 
would offer no protection in circumstances in which the target of 
the investigation is never brought to trial.58 In that circum-
stance, an aggrieved individual has resort only to a civil lawsuit, 
but the doctrine of qualified immunity provides law enforcement 
with a robust defense in all but the most egregious cases featur-
ing known breaches of whatever protections the Fourth 
Amendment does provide.59 And even when a plaintiff does 
 
391–92 (discussing police surveys revealing that exclusion “is an ephemeral punishment” 
at best); Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Applica-
tion of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 Emory L J 937, 953, 974 (1983) (observing 
that “[o]fficers who testify in suppression hearings may not be present in court when the 
judge gives his ruling and even if they are informed of the outcome, they may not be told 
of the judge’s rationale” and that, because “there is no formal mechanism by which a po-
lice department learns of the suppression of evidence because of the misconduct of its 
officers[,] . . . it becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discipline those officers 
whose actions most frequently result in the suppression of evidence”); Oaks, 37 U Chi L 
Rev at 667 (presenting empirical evidence that offers “little support for the proposition 
that the exclusionary rule discourages illegal searches and seizures, but [that] falls short 
of establishing that it does not”); id at 706–09 (offering evidence that suggests the exclu-
sionary rule is ineffective). 
 57 See Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 238–39 (2011) (discussing the application 
of the “good-faith” exception to the exclusionary rule). See also Slobogin, 1999 U Ill L Rev 
at 375–76 & n 39 (cited in note 56) (describing “today’s swiss cheese exclusionary rule”). 
 58 See Slobogin, 1999 U Ill L Rev at 374–75 (cited in note 56) (citations omitted): 
In a large number of cases involving questionable stops and searches, the po-
lice do not make an arrest, either because they never intended to do so or be-
cause they find nothing, so the exclusionary rule never has a chance to come 
into play. Even when an arrest occurs, the search issue frequently is not liti-
gated because the police don’t pursue the case, or because the case is resolved 
through a plea or in some other fashion that avoids or undermines a hearing 
on the Fourth Amendment issue. The number of cases in the latter category is 
enormous; plea bargains dispose of ninety to ninety-five percent of all criminal 
actions. 
 59 See White v Pauly, 137 S Ct 548, 551 (2017) (“[Qualified] immunity protects ‘all 
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”), quoting Mullenix 
v Luna, 136 S Ct 305, 308 (2015). See also Kisela v Hughes, 138 S Ct 1148, 1162 (2018) 
(Sotomayor dissenting) (“[The Court’s] one-sided approach to qualified immunity trans-
forms the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deter-
rent effect of the Fourth Amendment.”); Stephen R. Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas 
Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on 
the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfor-
tunate Consequences, 113 Mich L Rev 1219, 1245 (2015) (observing that the Supreme 
Court’s qualified immunity decisions have “created such powerful shields for law en-
forcement that people whose rights are violated, even in egregious ways, often lack any 
means of enforcing those rights”). Convicted individuals seeking civil damages face an-
other hurdle: the Heck v Humphrey bar further insulates investigators from liability by 
prohibiting convicted individuals from filing civil suits complaining of, among other 
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manage to subject law enforcement to liability, the evidence 
suggests that the prospective disciplinary effect of that liability 
on law enforcement behavior tends to be scant and unreliable.60 
For all of these reasons, it is “difficult for robust Fourth 
Amendment protections to apply online.”61 Though the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement is popularly understood to 
be the ne plus ultra of privacy protection, the rules surrounding 
searches and subpoenas—and the remedies available for their 
violation—make it a weak check on government intrusion, par-
ticularly in the context of electronically transmitted and ISP-
stored data.62 And while that ought to distress privacy advocates 
first and foremost, even those sympathetic to the government’s 
interests might concede that the existing doctrine is, as Justice 
Sotomayor observed, poorly tailored to the current era.63 
B. The All Writs Act 
Existing statutory frameworks are likewise becoming 
flawed or even obsolete as a result of the march of time and 
technology. For some of those statutes, such obsolescence can 
hardly be called a surprise. One of the major statutes at play in 
this arena is the AWA, initially enacted as part of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 and barely amended since then. Despite predating 
the advent of the telephone by nearly a century, to say nothing 
of the internet, the AWA has played a major role in the 
government’s attempts to secure judicial orders commanding 
technology companies to unlock devices like the iPhone seized in 
the course of investigating the San Bernardino shooting.64 The 
 
things, unlawful searches that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] convic-
tion or sentence.” Heck v Humphrey, 512 US 477, 487 (1994). 
 60 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Law-
suits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L Rev 1023, 1067 (2010) (“[M]any 
law enforcement agencies do not gather information about past lawsuits. And without 
information about past suits, law enforcement can hardly make the types of informed 
decisions presupposed by judicial and scholarly theories of deterrence.”). 
 61 Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1212 (cited in note 41). See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct 
at 2262 (Gorsuch dissenting) (asking, in light of the third-party doctrine and the fact 
that “we use the Internet to do most everything,” “What’s left of the Fourth 
Amendment?”). 
 62 See Friedman, Unwarranted at 120, 122 (cited in note 11) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
has taken a cavalier, if not outright dismissive, attitude toward [the warrant require-
ment],” riddling it with “exception after exception.”). 
 63 See Jones, 565 US at 417–18 (Sotomayor concurring). 
 64 See All Writs Act Orders for Assistance from Tech Companies (American Civil 
Liberties Union, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/C633-8KLU (collecting cases). 
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AWA could even be called on to coerce ISPs with regard to other 
information stored by or produced by customers. 
The AWA provides that federal courts have the power to is-
sue “all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of 
law.”65 This might include, for example, orders compelling third 
parties like ISPs to produce certain information relevant to an 
ongoing investigation or outstanding court order. Indeed, to hear 
the government tell it, the AWA is a “venerable” and “vital part 
of our legal system,” compared to which “few laws are more vi-
tal.”66 But the AWA has also been described by the Supreme 
Court as “a residual source of authority,”67 and by some judges 
as a “gap filler” statute—a “source of interstitial authority” that 
merely relieves Congress of the obligation to anticipate and pro-
vide every possible writ or tool that a federal court might need 
in service of the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.68 
However one thinks of the AWA, it cannot plausibly be held 
out as a skeleton key for every possible need and every possible 
aim. So while the AWA has doubtless been applied “flexibly” in 
view of its aims,69 the words of the statute must mean 
something.70 This implies that there is some limit on what is 
“necessary or appropriate in aid” of a court’s jurisdiction and 
what is “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”71 Indeed, 
an expansive reading of these provisions might run afoul of the 
canon that Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes,”72 
 
 65 28 USC § 1651(a). 
 66 Government’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Opposition to Apple 
Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order, In re Search of an Apple iPhone, No 16-10, *3 (CD Cal filed 
Mar 10, 2016). 
 67 Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v United States Marshals Service, 474 US 34, 
43 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 68 In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc to Assist in the Execution of a Search Warrant 
Issued by This Court, 149 F Supp 3d 341, 353 (EDNY 2016). See also Michael v  
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 48 F3d 657, 669 (2d Cir 1995) (“[T]he scope of 
the all writs provision confine[s] it to filling the interstices of federal judicial power when 
these gaps threaten[ ] to thwart the otherwise proper exercise of federal courts’ jurisdic-
tion.”), quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, 474 US at 41. See also Morrison, 38 
Cardozo L Rev at 2046 (cited in note 2) (describing the AWA as “[d]esigned to fill in the 
gaps of federal judicial power”). 
 69 United States v New York Telephone Co, 434 US 159, 173 (1977). 
 70 See Duncan v Walker, 533 US 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our duty to give effect, if 
possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”), quoting United States v Menasche, 348 
US 528, 538–39 (1955) (quotation marks omitted). 
 71 28 USC § 1651(a). 
 72 Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 531 US 457, 468 (2001). 
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threaten the separation of powers,73 or intend consequences that 
may well be absurd.74 
But even if one could avoid those problems, the lack of  
clarity in the doctrine surrounding the AWA makes it so unreli-
able that even the government (to say nothing of the rest of us) 
ought to prefer something better tailored.75 When deciding 
whether to issue an order under the AWA, courts are to consider 
how “far removed” the subject of the order is “from the underly-
ing controversy,” how “unreasonable [a] burden[ ]” the order 
would place on the subject, and how “necessary” the subject’s as-
sistance is to addressing the underlying controversy.76 These are 
fuzzy concepts; indeed, by their terms, they aren’t even binary 
questions (“Is assistance necessary?”) but rather questions of 
degree (“How necessary is assistance?”) that then must be bal-
anced in some indeterminate fashion that risks ad hoc judgment 
calls and arbitrary distinctions. 
To be sure, the AWA might be made to work in a nonabsurd, 
relatively predictable fashion that does not threaten the separa-
tion of powers. The point is simply that doing so is difficult and 
would mean MacGyvering the statute in ways that lack clear 
limiting principles. At best, then, the AWA is an inferior way of 
governing law enforcement’s valid interests in an increasingly 
complex technological world. 
C. The Stored Communications Act 
The difficulties plaguing the application of the AWA are 
mirrored even in much more contemporary efforts to address the 
problem of investigation in the digital age. The SCA, enacted as 
part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,77 set 
 
 73 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc to Assist, 149 F Supp 3d at 361. See also 
Plum Creek Lumber Co v Hutton, 608 F2d 1283, 1290 (9th Cir 1979) (warning that 
adopting such an interpretation “would be to usurp the legislative function and to im-
properly extend the limited federal court jurisdiction”). 
 74 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc to Assist, 149 F Supp 3d at 367 n 33 (con-
sidering whether the AWA permits a court to compel a drug company to produce the 
drugs necessary for a court-ordered execution). The government had no answer to this 
hypothetical when it was raised at oral argument. Id at 372–73. 
 75 See United States v Hardage, 58 F3d 569, 574 (10th Cir 1995) (“Unfortunately, 
there is an extreme dearth of case law interpreting the substantive parameters of the All 
Writs Act.”); Morrison, 38 Cardozo L Rev at 2057 (cited in note 2) (“The best that can be 
said is that AWA jurisprudence does not appear to be the model of consistency.”). 
 76 New York Telephone Co, 434 US at 172–75. 
 77 Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848 (1986), codified as amended in various sections 
of Title 18. 
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out the primary statutory framework by which ISPs can be com-
pelled to disclose to the government communications and trans-
actional records in their custody. The statute is notably “dense 
and confusing,”78 but a short overview will suffice for present 
purposes. 
The SCA regulates the government’s ability to access both 
content data, which is the actual content of emails held by ISPs, 
and noncontent data, which is essentially all the rest of the data 
that ISPs hold. As for content data, the SCA draws distinctions 
based on whether the email has been opened and based on its 
age. For unopened emails in electronic storage on the server of 
an ISP for fewer than 180 days, the government needs a search 
warrant supported by probable cause in order to compel the ISP 
to turn over the email.79 But for unopened email in such storage 
for more than 180 days and for opened email, the government 
needs only an administrative or grand jury subpoena or a judi-
cial order based on “reasonable grounds to believe” that the con-
tents of the email “are relevant and material to an ongoing crim-
inal investigation.”80 Subpoenas of this type must be 
accompanied by notice to the user,81 unless a “supervisory offi-
cial” certifies that “there is reason to believe” that such notice 
will have an “adverse result.”82 Adverse results include the en-
dangerment of life or physical safety, flight from prosecution, 
destruction of or tampering with evidence, intimidation of po-
tential witnesses, or anything that would “otherwise seriously 
jeopardiz[e] an investigation or unduly delay[ ] a trial.”83 Judi-
cial orders of the type just outlined also must be accompanied by 
notice unless the issuing court concludes there is “reason to be-
lieve” that such notice will have one of these “adverse re-
sult[s].”84 When these circumstances exist, notice may be delayed 
for a period “not to exceed ninety days,” and the government is 
 
 78 Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1208 (cited in note 41). 
 79 18 USC § 2703(a). 
 80 18 USC § 2703(d). See also 18 USC § 2703(b)(1)(B) (authorizing such orders or 
subpoenas for emails in storage for longer than 180 days); Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 
1216, 1223 (cited in note 41) (discussing the different treatment of opened and unopened 
emails). 
 81 18 USC § 2703(b)(1)(B). 
 82 18 USC § 2705(a)(1)(B). 
 83 18 USC § 2705(a)(2). 
 84 18 USC § 2705(a)(1)(A). 
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entitled to further extensions “of up to ninety days each” upon 
further certification or order.85 
The bottom line is that, to access the content of unopened 
email that is six months old or younger, the government needs a 
warrant. But to access the content of older unopened email or 
opened email, the SCA says the government can get away with 
as little as an administrative subpoena.86 And while notice to the 
user is technically required, the government can simply certify 
and recertify that such notice might have adverse results and 
thereby delay that notice indefinitely. If the Fourth Amendment 
protects the content of emails regardless of their age,87 this as-
pect of the SCA addressing content data is arguably unconstitu-
tional, as the government may have recently conceded.88 If not, 
the stuff with which the SCA fills the gap—a subpoena without 
notice—is exceptionally weak.89 
A large part of why it is so weak is that the SCA “freez[es] 
into the law the understandings of computer network use” at the 
time it was enacted in 1986, and it divides the computing world 
into providers of “electronic communication service” (ECS) and 
providers of “remote computing service” (RCS).90 Simplifying 
greatly, ECS is basically short-term communication and 
“temporary, intermediate storage . . . incidental to” the 
transmitted communication, whereas RCS is long-term 
storage.91 Nowadays, ISPs usually offer users both ECS and RCS 
without any practical distinction92—certainly not one that users 
contemplate—but the SCA prescribes different rules for the two 
types of services. The result is that the statute considers new, 
unopened email to be part of ECS (with its warrant 
 
 85 18 USC § 2705(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(4). At the end of the delay period, however 
extended, the government must serve the user with a notice that states the nature of the 
law enforcement inquiry and informs the user that her information was supplied to an 
identified government authority on an identified date. 18 USC § 2705(a)(5). 
 86 See Friedman, Unwarranted at 246 (cited in note 11) (calling it a “strange  
loophole”). 
 87 See note 41. 
 88 See Transcript of Oral Argument, Carpenter v United States, No 16-402, *45 (US 
filed Nov 29, 2017). 
 89 See Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 41) (observing that “the 
government can often compel all opened e-mails from an ISP with a mere subpoena and 
without meaningful notice”); id at 1220 n 80 (noting that § 2703(b) might be 
unconstitutional). 
 90 Id at 1214. See also Friedman, Unwarranted at 246 (cited in note 11). 
 91 18 USC § 2510(17)(A) (ECS); 18 USC § 2510(17)(B) (RCS). See also Kerr, 72 Geo 
Wash L Rev at 1214–16 (cited in note 41) (explaining the distinction in greater detail). 
 92 See Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1215 (cited in note 41). 
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requirement), but it considers opened email or older unopened 
email to be part of RCS (with its substantially weaker privacy 
protections).93 
In addition to governing the handling of the kind of content 
data discussed so far, the SCA also covers noncontent data—
essentially everything besides the content of communications.94 
The statute divides noncontent data into two groups. Infor-
mation like a user’s name, address, telephone number, or net-
work address; the length of the user’s service contract with the 
provider; the user’s payment information; and the user’s connec-
tion records and “records of session times and durations” fall  
into one group.95 The SCA provides that the government can ac-
cess such information with merely an administrative or grand 
jury subpoena and without any obligation to provide notice to 
the user.96 All other noncontent data—addresses emailed, sites 
visited, etc.97—whether considered ECS or RCS, falls into  
another group. To access that kind of information, the govern-
ment needs either a warrant supported by probable cause or the 
kind of court order supported by “reasonable grounds to believe” 
that the data “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation” discussed above in the context of content data.98 
(The government still need not provide notice to the user.99) Note 
that, for this latter group of noncontent data, while a grand jury 
or administrative subpoena will not suffice, a court order issued 
at a standard that “falls well short” of probable cause still will.100 
As even this short summary ought to demonstrate, the 
SCA is a thoroughly complex statute that is rooted in an out-
dated conception of the relevant technology, that provides 
“surprisingly weak” protection for a wide swath of content in-
 
 93 See id at 1216. 
 94 It is important not to underestimate the meaningfulness of noncontent data. 
Particularly when compiled, it can be “just as revealing of our lives as content infor-
mation.” Friedman, Unwarranted at 254 (cited in note 11). 
 95 18 USC § 2703(c). See Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1219 (cited in note 41) (ex-
plaining that Congress deemed this enumerated list “less private than other records”). 
 96 18 USC § 2703(c)(2), (3). 
 97 See Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1228 (cited in note 41) (explaining what non-
content data includes). 
 98 18 USC § 2703(d). See also 18 USC § 2703(c)(1)(A), (B). The government can also 
compel the disclosure of noncontent records with the consent of the user. 18 USC 
§ 2703(c)(1)(C). 
 99 18 USC § 2703(c)(3). 
 100 Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2210. 
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formation,101 and that strikes a puzzling balance in the protec-
tion it offers to noncontent information. Perhaps even more 
than the AWA, it is being asked to do a job that it was not de-
signed to do in a context it was not designed to fit.102 
D. Recent Proposals 
Recognizing some of these anachronisms and inadequacies, 
legislators and scholars have set to work crafting possible re-
placements or additions to the government’s toolkit. The one 
that has come closest to becoming law is the EPA. This bill, 
which has been thrice passed in the House and thrice left on the 
cutting room floor in the Senate, would leave the rules for non-
content data unchanged but would require a warrant supported 
by probable cause for all content data—whether ECS or RCS, 
and regardless of its age or opened/unopened status.103 This re-
form would simplify the SCA while also substantially raising the 
level of protection afforded to content data: administrative sub-
poenas and “reason to believe” court orders would no longer suf-
fice.104 At the same time, however, the EPA would double the no-
tice delay period from 90 to 180 days, again subject to “one or 
more extensions,” without amending the standard under which 
such delays would be authorized.105 
The EPA’s across-the-board warrant requirement for con-
tent information is certainly a boon to privacy advocates, who 
could perhaps live with the fact that it comes with an expanded 
notice delay period. After all, the warrant requirement means 
that the underlying search will have undergone a more rigorous 
review in the first instance. But the protection of much sensitive 
noncontent data would remain relatively low. Moreover, the 
EPA might well overcorrect the SCA’s privacy flaws.106 For ex-
 
 101 Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1233 (cited in note 41). 
 102 See id at 1214 (“The SCA is not a catch-all statute designed to protect the  
privacy of stored Internet communications; instead it is narrowly tailored to provide a 
set of Fourth Amendment-like protections for computer networks.”). 
 103 See, for example, Email Privacy Act § 3, HR 699, 114th Cong, 2d Sess, in 162 
Cong Rec H 2022 (daily ed Apr 27, 2016). See also notes 8–9 (discussing the fate of these 
bills). 
 104 18 USC § 2703(b)(1)(B), (d).  
 105 Compare HR 699 § 2705(c) (cited in note 8), with 18 USC § 2705(a). 
 106 See Christopher Slobogin, Policing, Databases, and Surveillance: Five Regulatory 
Categories *4, 8 (Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No 17-23, Apr 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/WZ49-PB78 (noting that a broad warrant requirement “has problems of 
its own”: it “overprotects the interests at stake” by sweeping up “a large number of 
98 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:77 
	
ample, not all agencies that conduct investigations—and from 
whose investigations society benefits—have the power to seek 
and execute warrants. As Mary Jo White, then the chair of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), explained, the fact 
that civil law enforcement agencies like the SEC (as well as the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission) cannot obtain warrants means that the EPA would 
prevent those agencies “from getting any electronic communica-
tions from Internet service providers, regardless of the circum-
stances.”107 The EPA would thus hamstring civil investigations 
into Ponzi schemes and insider trading by creating an “unprece-
dented digital shelter . . . that does not exist for paper materials 
. . . [and] that would enable wrongdoers to conceal evidence.”108 
It is perhaps for reasons like these that the Senate has consist-
ently declined to consider the bill.109 Or, perhaps, there is simply 
insufficient support in the Senate for such an increase in privacy 
protection.110 
Other reforms might entail more modest adjustments. For 
example, rather than require a warrant, a new statute could ad-
dress concerns like White’s by requiring that the government get 
some other court order for the data it seeks, governed by a sub–
warrant standard like “reasonable grounds to believe.”111 A new 
amendment might also reduce the period for which notice can be 
delayed.112 These might be reasonable “middle ground” im-
provements,113 and perhaps they might attract political support 
in ways that the EPA has not. 
Indeed, tweaking timelines and modulating burdens of proof 
might well be the best our politics can handle, and the search for 
the perfect ought not be the enemy of the good. But we can do 
better. Just like the EPA, and like the SCA before it, these ad-
justments are either/or, on/off solutions. They risk being reactive 
 
situations” that “do not merit the full protection of a judicial probable-cause finding,” 
and it “handcuff[s] legitimate government efforts to nab terrorists and criminals”). 
 107 Mary Jo White, Privacy Rules Shouldn’t Handcuff the S.E.C. (NY Times, May 12, 
2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/opinion/privacy-rules-shouldnt-
handcuff-the-sec.html (visited Oct 22, 2018) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 108 Id. 
 109 See note 9 and accompanying text. 
 110 See note 10 and accompanying text. 
 111 18 USC § 2703(d) (indicating the standard for court-ordered disclosure of elec-
tronic information). See also Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1234–35 (cited in note 41) 
(making such a suggestion). 
 112 See Kerr, 72 Geo Wash L Rev at 1235 (cited in note 41). 
 113 Id at 1234. 
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to the latest headlines, they are not a recipe for precise calibra-
tion of public investigatory need and private interests in  
privacy, and they avoid deeper questions about how investiga-
tions should be governed in the digital age.114 And the hazier the 
test that will apply when the protection is “on,” the more confu-
sion and unpredictability will plague the courts, investigating 
entities, and American citizens. The bottom line is that there is 
only so much that can be done by coloring inside the old lines 
and offering variations on the SCA’s themes.115 
The balance of this Article colors outside those lines and of-
fers a different replacement inspired by an underappreciated 
source: the government’s takings power. Part II sets out what 
the approach might look like and defends the analogy. Part III 
grapples with its normative implications. 
II.  TAKING DATA 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, resolution of the ten-
sion between privacy and law enforcement in the digital arena 
has proven elusive. Even the legislative solutions that have 
emerged are not durable enough to adapt to new technology and 
new needs. Part of the reason why answers seem so hard to find 
is no doubt that the question being asked is nearly impossible to 
answer in general terms. We want the police to have the right 
incentives to investigate when and where they should be inves-
tigating so as to protect the public, and we want them to respect 
our privacy by not investigating when the intrusion is too great 
relative to the benefits the investigation would generate.116 But 
because it is hard to make this call at the level of wholesale leg-
islation, traditional tools and rules of criminal procedure that 
speak either in bright-line rules or in hazy tests will consistently 
fail to resolve this tension. 
Property law, by contrast, offers a tool that is designed to 
strike precisely the kind of retail-level balance between public 
benefits and private burdens that we are looking for: the power 
 
 114 See notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
 115 See Berman, 102 Minn L Rev at 632–33 (cited in note 13) (noting the inadequacy 
of the current legislative frameworks, which lack any “overarching, unified information 
protection regime”). 
 116 See Friedman, Unwarranted at 237 (cited in note 11) (“That’s the tension: protect 
the information, and law enforcement says it can’t go after some bad guys; weaken pro-
tections, and we all can say adios to any shard of security from government prying.”). 
100 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:77 
	
of eminent domain.117 And it is a tool that can potentially do the 
same in the investigatory sphere. Indeed, the Takings Clause 
has a number of features that can be readily adapted to govern 
the investigation of ISP-held data. Moreover, the analogy would 
be both doctrinally and theoretically sound, doing little violence 
to the law of takings, theories of property, or the law of criminal 
procedure. 
A. A Data Takings Act 
To see how this might work, consider the terms and 
operation of the Takings Clause. It provides that government 
may not use its power of eminent domain to “take[ ]” private 
property, except if it does so “for public use” and renders “just 
compensation” to the former property owner.118 While this 
provision is phrased by way of restriction, it necessarily implies 
the power of the government to act when the conditions are 
satisfied. In other words, the government may exercise its power 
of eminent domain to take private property so long as it does so 
for public use and with just compensation—that is, by paying 
fair market value, measured at the time of the taking, to the 
 
 117 Another way of framing this turn is by understanding the existing regime—in 
which information is, say, either subject to a warrant requirement or not—as either pro-
tecting a privacy entitlement with a property rule (absent a warrant, law enforcement 
can gain access only in a voluntary transaction with the target) or providing no privacy 
entitlement at all. See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liabil-
ity Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1105 
(1972). Proposals such as the EPA can be characterized similarly. See text accompanying 
notes 103–10. This is problematic for the same reason that property-rule protection often 
risks being problematic: negotiated bargains or even breaches of the protection that 
would be socially desirable may not occur because of holdout problems and other high 
transaction costs. See Calabresi and Melamed, 85 Harv L Rev at 1118–19. In this con-
text, these risks are quite likely to emerge: targets who have broken the law obviously 
face very high stakes and will resist voluntary disclosure at any cost, but even innocent 
people who simply wish to keep their information confidential from law enforcement may 
not be so inclined to provide access to it upon request even if that disclosure would be 
beneficial for society. A takings-based regime, by contrast, would protect privacy with a 
liability rule: privacy would be protected against government intrusion unless the gov-
ernment paid compensation at a collectively determined value to the person whose pri-
vacy was intruded upon. See id at 1092. (Indeed, eminent domain is a classic example of 
liability rule protection. Id at 1108.) This solves the problem created by property-rule 
protection by permitting efficient breaches of the entitlement while removing from the 
entitlement holder the power to hold out. The primary objection to liability rules is that 
they are often too difficult to administer when the costs of assessing value are high. See 
id at 1119, 1125. But as discussed at greater length in Part III.B, that objection can be 
adequately met here. I am grateful to Lior Strahilevitz and Maureen Brady for noting 
this lens. 
 118 US Const Amend V. 
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now former owner of the property in question.119 And while real 
property is perhaps the most common subject of eminent 
domain, the power sweeps wider.120 Personal property, and even 
intangible property, may be taken by eminent domain.121 
Note that the “public use” requirement does not embrace  
only those takings in which the public will actually be permitted 
to use or have access to the property in question. Rather, the 
question is whether the taking has a “public purpose.”122 The 
Supreme Court has held that alleviating blight,123 reducing the 
concentration of land ownership,124 and promoting economic de-
velopment125 are all public purposes that can justify taking pri-
vate property. This pattern reflects a judgment on the part of 
the Court that it ought to “eschew[ ] rigid formulas and intrusive 
scrutiny” and instead “afford[ ] legislatures broad latitude in  
determining what public needs justify the use of the takings 
power.”126 In fact, a taking may be justified as being for a public 
use even if the government hands the property over to another 
private party that will make what the government believes to be 
a better use of it.127 All that matters is “the taking’s purpose, and 
not its mechanics,” and courts will not lightly unsettle a legisla-
ture’s identification of a public purpose.128 
 
 119 See Horne, 135 S Ct at 2432, quoting United States v 50 Acres of Land, 469 US 
24, 29 (1984). See also Palazzolo v Rhode Island, 533 US 606, 625 (2001); United States v 
Miller, 317 US 369, 373–74 (1943). 
 120 See City of Oakland v Oakland Raiders, 646 P2d 835, 838 (Cal 1982) (“No consti-
tutional restriction, federal or state, purports to limit the nature of the property that 
may be taken by eminent domain.”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of 
Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 Tex L Rev 685, 694 (1989) (“[A]ny 
type of property, tangible or intangible, is subject to the exercise of eminent domain.”). 
 121 See Horne, 135 S Ct at 2425–28 (holding that personal property is subject to the 
Takings Clause); Monsanto, 467 US at 1003–04 (holding that trade secrets are protected 
by the Takings Clause); Kimball Laundry Co v United States, 338 US 1, 16 (1949) (hold-
ing that the government owed just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for having 
taken a laundry company’s trade routes); James v Campbell, 104 US 356, 357–58 (1881) 
(holding that patents are protected by the Takings Clause); West River Bridge Co v Dix, 
47 US (6 How) 507, 534 (1848) (explaining that the distinction for purposes of the  
Takings Clause between “property which is corporeal” and property which is not, like a 
franchise, “has no foundation in reason”). 
 122 Kelo v City of New London, 545 US 469, 479–80 (2005) (collecting cases). 
 123 Berman v Parker, 348 US 26, 33–35 (1954). 
 124 Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 467 US 229, 241–42 (1984). 
 125 Kelo, 545 US at 483–84. 
 126 Id at 483. 
 127 See Midkiff, 467 US at 243–44 (“The mere fact that property taken outright by 
eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not con-
demn that taking as having only a private purpose.”). See also Kelo, 545 US at 485–87. 
 128 Midkiff, 467 US at 244. 
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Finally, as a matter of statute, the federal government must 
comply with the process set out in the Declaration of Taking 
Act.129 Specifically, a governmental entity seeking to take prop-
erty on behalf of the United States must first file a declaration 
in the district court in which the property is located containing a 
statement of the authority under which the taking is being 
made, the public use for which the property is to be taken, a de-
scription of the property sufficient to identify it, the interests in 
the property that are being acquired, a plan showing the land 
taken, and an estimate of just compensation.130 Upon the filing 
of this declaration and, crucially, the depositing of a bond in the 
amount of the estimated compensation, title to the property 
vests in the government and the right to just compensation vests 
in the former owners.131 Litigation may then proceed if necessary 
regarding the actual amount of compensation and the lawful-
ness of the taking itself.132 
A Data Takings Act (DTA) would take a similar form. It is 
not my aim here to offer a definitive legislative proposal with 
nonnegotiable operational details but rather to provide enough 
of a starting point to enable discussion about the normative and 
practical implications. After all, those implications might point 
the way toward further desirable features or suggest necessary 
safeguards. Moreover, while this proposal is aimed at the federal 
level—in the interest of promoting uniformity and because the 
relevant existing statutes and notable disputes are federal and 
involve federal law enforcement actors—it could also function in 
principle as a model for states and localities to enact with 
respect to their own investigating entities, though there may be 
additional complexities at the state and local levels.133 
As a first step, the DTA would provide that, in order to ac-
cess ISP-held data like sites visited and persons emailed for 
 
 129 46 Stat 1421 (1931), codified as amended in various sections of Title 40. 
 130 40 USC § 3114(a). 
 131 40 USC § 3114(b). See, for example, United States v Sid-Mars Restaurant & 
Lounge, Inc, 644 F3d 270, 272 (5th Cir 2011); United States v 21.54 Acres of Land, More 
or Less, in Marshall County, 491 F2d 301, 304 (4th Cir 1973). 
 132 See FRCP 71.1 (providing rules to govern takings proceedings for “real and per-
sonal property”); Anatomy of a Condemnation Case (US Department of Justice, May 15, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K7J6-AJ5E. 
 133 One meaningful source of complexity is that states and localities may react dif-
ferently to budgetary pressures than agencies of the federal government, may be more 
constrained by such pressures, and indeed may perceive different pressures altogether. 
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some or all law enforcement purposes,134 the government would 
be obligated to employ a takings-based process (rather than any 
other investigative tool) to acquire that data. Just as with the 
ordinary takings process, the DTA would require a law enforce-
ment agency seeking to acquire ISP-held data for investigatory 
purposes to file a declaration in district court and to pay a bond 
for the estimated compensation.135 
Some additional details would be necessary, however. First, 
the DTA would allocate to the holder of an email account or to 
the creator of ISP-held data—the person whose privacy is impli-
cated—a quasi-property right in that data reflecting the private 
nature of the information in question.136 This would be a limited 
right only for the purposes of enabling this takings-based regime 
to function and directing the payment of compensation.137 It 
 
 134 Because this Article is meant to prompt a discussion about the possibilities of a 
law of this type, a precise definition of the set of investigations covered by the DTA is not 
strictly necessary. For example, Congress could narrow the idea and limit it to only, say, 
terrorism investigations. If it does that, it might opt to call the statute the Data Anti-
Terrorism Acquisition Act or Deter Acts of Terrorism by Acquisition Act, which, while 
somewhat clumsy, reduce to an attractive acronym: DATA Act. See Mary Whisner, 
What’s in a Statute Name?, 97 L Library J 169, 179–82 (2005) (cataloging Congress’s 
penchant for employing clever acronyms in statute titles). Where appropriate in the bal-
ance of the Article, I point out the implications of certain scoping choices as well as the 
choices one might make in light of particular implementation concerns. 
 135 See notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 136 See note 150 and accompanying text (noting that the government can create 
property rights). This allocation to the user, rather than to the ISP for example, is de-
signed to reflect the privacy interests at issue—interests that the ISP does not have. See 
Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2272 (Gorsuch dissenting) (suggesting that it is “entirely possible 
a person’s cell-site data could qualify as his papers or effects” because “customers have 
substantial legal interests in this information, including at least some right to include, 
exclude, and control its use”). In making this allocation, the statute would be operating 
on a relatively clean slate because determining, for example, who owns an email as a 
matter of existing law has proven difficult. Some of the most sustained attention to this 
question has arisen regarding what happens to emails and social media accounts upon 
the death of the account holder, but answers remain stubbornly elusive for now. See 
Orin Kerr, Who Can Access Your E-mails after You Die? (Wash Post, Oct 17, 2017), 
online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/17/who-
can-access-your-e-mails-after-you-die/?utm_term=.86b7ed7c9dfc (visited Oct 21, 2018) 
(Perma archive unavailable); Jonathan J. Darrow and Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a 
Decedent’s E-mails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 NYU J 
Legis & Pub Pol 281 (2007) (discussing the open question and the impact of ISP terms of 
service, and suggesting that email be thought of as a bailment). Indeed, the Supreme 
Court recently denied certiorari in a case implicating the question. See Ajemian v  
Yahoo!, Inc, 84 NE3d 766 (Mass 2017), cert denied, 138 S Ct 1327 (2018). 
 137 One might object to a scheme in which suspected criminals are paid for their 
data. But even guilty people—to say nothing of merely possibly guilty people—value 
their privacy. When the government intrudes upon that privacy, those people experience 
a loss all the same as innocent people. Compensating them for that intrusion is therefore 
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would not, for reasons I discuss below, create a right to sell this 
private data to any willing buyer; rather, it would give structure 
to the process by which one and only one buyer—namely, the 
government—could purchase that data at its own election.138 Ac-
cordingly, when the government acquires the data, it would not 
acquire anything that had ever been further alienable to others, 
and that limitation would run with the data.139 The government 
would therefore not be able to resell the data it took. The statute 
could even expressly prohibit the government from doing so to 
make this doubly clear. 
Second, the DTA would give authority to make an 
investigatory taking of this information to both criminal 
investigatory entities (like the FBI) and civil investigatory 
entities (like the SEC, to address Mary Jo White’s concerns140), 
and it would require such entities to use that authority and 
associated process rather than traditional tools like warrants or 
subpoenas. The entity would have to identify in its declaration 
precisely the property it seeks to take and establish the safety- 
or welfare-protecting public use that the taking would serve. A 
declaration devoid of any reason why acquiring the data in 
question would advance these goals by furthering an 
investigation would be inadequate.141 The agency would also 
have to include in its declaration an estimate of the 
compensation owed and pay a bond in that amount. Finally, for 
reasons I discuss in more detail below, the DTA would require 
 
not equivalent to “rewarding” them for their (suspected) criminal activity, at least not 
any more than is affording them due process or any of the other rights and privileges 
extended to the accused. But if one were concerned nonetheless, one solution might be to 
put the compensation in escrow and use it to pay for the defense to which the accused is 
constitutionally entitled. 
 138 See notes 155–88 and accompanying text (discussing arguments against market-
able rights in data and the contours of restrictions on alienability). 
 139 See notes 155–88. The resulting limitation on the government’s ability to resell 
follows from the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, which means that one may not give 
what one does not have; in other words, one cannot sell any better title than he owns. 
Mitchell v Hawley, 83 US 544, 550 (1872). 
 140 See note 107 and accompanying text. 
 141 A suspicionless investigative taking would likely not pass muster under the 
“public use” requirement, but the DTA could make that clear as a matter of statutory 
text. See notes 122–28 and accompanying text; notes 189–93 and accompanying text (ex-
ploring the application of the “public use” requirement to the context of data takings). 
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that a politically appointed official within the agency sign off on 
the taking.142 
Third, to address some of the unique concerns applicable to 
this context, which Part III further explains, the DTA would  
also mandate that the funding for the required compensation 
payments come from the investigating entity’s own budget.143 As 
a failsafe, the DTA could also incorporate considerations for exi-
gent circumstances144 and could provide that an agency that 
runs out of money, but believes it still needs particular ISP-held 
data, can seek a court order excusing it from the terms of the 
statute and issuing it a traditional warrant upon a showing of 
both probable cause and exceptional need. Further, while tak-
ings compensation is generally set at the fair market value of 
the property taken measured at the time of the taking,145 and 
while this Article discusses below how that measure would 
translate to the realm of the DTA, the statute could even clarify 
how this valuation would be made.146 Finally, the DTA could re-
tain the SCA’s delayed notification regime,147 but it would also 
require each agency to publicly issue a quarterly report to  
Congress indicating the number of takings made, the price of 
each, and whether and how the applicable investigation was ma-
terially advanced by the data that was purchased.148 
While the fact that the DTA I sketch out does not contain a 
warrant requirement and instead builds an entirely distinct in-
vestigatory framework might seem problematic, that is precisely 
what the SCA already does. It is also what the EPA would con-
tinue to do for noncontent information. But instead of drawing 
the kinds of blunt, arbitrary, and potentially complex lines that 
 
 142 See notes 218–60 (discussing ways in which accountability and other political 
dynamics would join with the requirement that compensation be paid to generate behav-
ioral changes on the part of investigators). 
 143 See notes 231–32 and accompanying text (discussing the import of this  
requirement). 
 144 See King, 563 US at 460 (discussing the exigent circumstances exceptions to the 
warrant requirement and their justifications). 
 145 See note 119 and accompanying text (noting the fair-market-value standard). 
The fact that value is assessed at the time of the taking would prevent gamesmanship in 
which the government retroactively adjusts its valuation once it sees the data it 
acquires. 
 146 See Part III.B (discussing the valuation aspect of implementing the DTA). 
 147 See 18 USC § 2705(a). The payment of compensation would not jeopardize 
secrecy (in the event the court authorized a disclosure delay) because the government’s 
bond could simply be paid in escrow to the court. 
 148 See notes 233–39 and accompanying text (revealing the import of this reporting 
requirement). 
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these existing statutes and proposals do—lines that are destined 
to become obsolete as technology advances—the DTA would 
draw inspiration from the government’s takings power and offer 
a more neutral and resilient mechanism designed to achieve  
retail-level balancing of private burdens and public benefits. 
And rather than just add it to the mix of options for the govern-
ment, the DTA would demand that this particular tool be used 
in the relevant set of investigations and would set up a structure 
within which it would be used. By channeling the government in 
this way, the DTA could bring coherence, predictability, and 
balance to an area of law and policy that sorely needs it. 
B. The Property Analogy 
Before exploring those benefits in earnest, and before engag-
ing with related implementation questions, it is worth pausing 
to examine the theoretical and doctrinal bases on which this 
property analogy rests. After all, if the world of data investiga-
tions bears no similarity to the world of property and eminent 
domain, a regime for the former inspired by the latter—even if 
otherwise attractive—might make little sense. In fact, however, 
there are serious connections between the two. 
The first possible pivot point has to do with whether private 
data and rights of access to such data could be conceived of as 
akin to the types of property subject to eminent domain. To be 
sure, the law does not presently recognize a property right in a 
particular piece of data,149 but the government “clearly [has] 
power to create property rights,” and creating a species of prop-
erty right with respect to ISP-held data is conceptually sound.150 
 
 149 See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan L Rev 1125, 
1131 (2000) (“Indeed, the traditional view in American law has been that information as 
such cannot be owned by any person.”). See also Moore v Regents of the University of 
California, 793 P2d 479, 493 (Cal 1990) (holding that a person does not have a property 
right in her genetic information). 
 150 Samuelson, 52 Stan L Rev at 1134 (cited in note 149). See also Lawrence Lessig, 
The Architecture of Privacy, 1 Vand J Ent L & Prac 56, 63 (1999); Richard S. Murphy, 
Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 
Georgetown L J 2381, 2383–84 (1996). At least one member of the current Supreme 
Court evidently agrees that electronic communications data can be conceived of as 
property. See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2270 (Gorsuch dissenting) (observing that “[s]tate 
(or sometimes federal) law often creates rights in both tangible and intangible things” 
and suggesting that treating “digital record[s]” as “property” may be sound); United 
States v Ackerman, 831 F3d 1292, 1307–08 (10th Cir 2016) (Gorsuch) (applying a 
property-based trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment to find that a search occurred 
when a government agent examined an email). And while there are disputes as to which 
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After all, at the heart of what property rights are meant to pro-
tect is the right to exclude others and to control access.151 This 
same interest in exclusion and control is precisely why people 
value the private nature of their data in the first place: when 
people create data and store it in a place to which they can limit 
access, like a password-protected email account, they have me-
morialized a piece of private personal information over which 
they hope and expect to retain control.152 In this way, one’s  
interest in, say, her email address book is all at once one of pri-
vacy and one of exclusion, as the Supreme Court has recently 
recognized.153 The two are deeply intertwined, and the latter is 
fundamentally a form of property interest. Conceiving of one’s 
 
governments can create property rights for which purposes, there is little reason why the 
power to create property rights for the purposes of a federal law, like this Article’s 
proposal, cannot reside (even if nonexclusively) in the federal government. See Orin 
Kerr, Can the Federal Government Define “Property” for Purposes of Federal Law? (The 
Volokh Conspiracy, Mar 28, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/G9JQ-TA7K. See also 
Part II.A (noting that this proposal may also be a model for states). 
 151 See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp, 458 US 419, 435–36 (1982) 
(identifying these rights as constituting the “bundle” of property rights); Kaiser Aetna v 
United States, 444 US 164, 179–80 (1979) (describing the right to exclude as “so 
universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right”); International News 
Service v The Associated Press, 248 US 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis dissenting) (“An 
essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying 
it.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 
Mich L Rev 1835, 1836 (2006) (“American courts and commentators have deemed the 
‘right to exclude’ foremost among the property rights.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Property 
and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb L Rev 730, 752 (1998) (calling the right to exclude the 
“sine qua non” of property). I do not intend here to wade into the robust debate about 
“the centrality of the right to exclude to the definition of property.” Jonathan Klick and 
Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical Assessment, 165 
U Pa L Rev 917, 935 (2017). Rather, it suffices for present purposes to note that even 
many of those who would not call the right to exclude the sole characteristic of property 
nonetheless recognize that it is among the important characteristics of property. See, for 
example, Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 Cornell L Rev 1063, 
1066 (2009) (“[A]lthough the right to exclude is part of the core of ownership, the core is 
more complex than exclusion alone.”); Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 
Rutgers L Rev 357, 370–71 (1954) (arguing that, while property may involve other 
rights, it “must at least involve a right to exclude”). 
 152 See Thyroff v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co, 864 NE2d 1272, 1278 (NY 2007) 
(holding that a claim for conversion of electronic data is cognizable because “it generally 
is not the physical nature of a document that determines its worth, it is the information 
memorialized in the document that has intrinsic value”). 
 153 See Byrd v United States, 138 S Ct 1518, 1527 (2018) (linking privacy and exclu-
sion by noting that “‘[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude 
others,’ and, in the main, ‘one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in 
all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude’”), 
quoting Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 143 n 12 (1978); Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1528 (referring 
to “the expectation of privacy that comes from lawful possession and control and the at-
tendant right to exclude”) (emphasis added). 
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interest in that data as property-like thus reflects the very fea-
ture that makes the data valuable to its creator—its exclusive 
and private nature—as well as the primary threat to that data’s 
value, namely its becoming nonprivate and nonexcludable.154 
At the same time, however, many scholars have argued that 
personal data should not be considered a form of property.155 
Their primary concern is a consequentialist one: they fear that 
treating data like property will erode the privacy protection it is 
afforded. This is either because propertizing data will “encour-
age[ ] transactions in data that most of us would prefer be dis-
couraged”156 or because information asymmetries and collective 
action problems will lead people to sign away too much of their 
personal data.157 But these critiques are raised in the context of 
contemplating a wide and open market for personal data.158 And 
while at least something of a market in some personal data has 
already come to fruition,159 expanding or endorsing such a mar-
ket is neither this Article’s aim nor a necessary consequence of 
recognizing any property interest in personal data.160 Instead, 
this Article contemplates a sui generis regime governing law en-
forcement’s access to ISP-held data for investigatory purposes, 
in which private data is conceived of as a form of property  
within that regime. 
Of course, it is fair to ask whether these critiques apply all 
the same within a framework like this Article’s, which is based 
 
 154 See James Y. Stern, Intellectual Property and the Myth of Nonrivalry *61–62 
(unpublished manuscript, 2018) (on file with author): 
[O]btaining access is clearly injury in itself, even if others’ access is otherwise 
undiminished. It isn’t hard to imagine that someone doesn’t remember what 
they wrote in an email two years ago and wouldn’t really care if the email were 
permanently erased but might very much care whether someone else gets to 
read the message. 
 155 See, for example, Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2057 (cited in note 23) (“Legal 
scholars interested in protecting information privacy [ ] have been suspicious of treating 
personal data as a form of property.”). 
 156 Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan L Rev 1283, 
1303 (2000). 
 157 See Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 Stan L Rev 1545, 1551 (2000); Julie E. 
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan L Rev 
1373, 1391–92 (2000); Samuelson, 52 Stan L Rev at 1145 (cited in note 149). 
 158 See Cohen, 52 Stan L Rev at 1391 (cited in note 157) (equating “[p]roperty talk 
about data privacy” with “enabling . . . trade”). See also Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 
2076 (cited in note 23) (framing these objections as objections to “data trade”). 
 159 See note 264 and accompanying text. 
 160 See Jesse Dukeminier, et al, Property 177 (Wolters Kluwer 9th ed 2017) (discuss-
ing severing the recognition of a property interest in a thing from the recognition of the 
interest-holder’s ability to sell that thing in a market transaction). 
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on the Takings Clause, but the answer on that score is no. This 
is because, unlike a large-scale free market in data, takings are 
a decidedly nonmarket framework. By definition, these transac-
tions are nonconsensual, monopsony-like transactions: there is 
only one buyer that can exercise the power (the government), 
and that buyer exercises its power without the agreement of the 
target owner. There is no mechanism by which a data owner can 
put her information up for sale, nor is there a mechanism by 
which an array of potential buyers can make offers. Embracing a 
takings analogy is therefore not likely to lead to a robust data 
trade—with the attendant concerns about privacy erosion that 
many have—because nothing about the exercise of eminent  
domain enables trade. 
There is a related concern that propertizing data would 
make privacy dependent on socioeconomic status. The wealthy 
would be able to maintain privacy, the concern goes, because 
they could afford not to sell access to their private data, while 
those less well-off would find themselves coerced by circum-
stance (or education level, or predatory practices, etc.) to give up 
their privacy. As Professor Pamela Samuelson has put it, “If in-
formation privacy is a civil liberty, it may make no more sense to 
propertize personal data than to commodify voting rights.”161 Ac-
cepting the premise of the argument for the moment, this distri-
butional concern carries substantially less weight than it might 
elsewhere in a nonmarket, takings-based context in which  
everyone is a priori equally coerced and, by definition, takings 
are nonconsensual, coercive transfers of property rights.162 
Moreover, the danger that some people will feel obligated by cir-
cumstance to volunteer their information to a buyer does not 
arise within a takings framework because the transfers occur 
only upon the request of the government. Finally, however, 
there is a deeper problem with the premise of this concern. The 
idea that propertizing data necessarily risks commodifying civil 
liberties elides an important distinction between a thing and an 
associated right or liberty. Things (like data) are distinct from 
rights (like voting rights or even privacy rights) even if commod-
ifying the thing has consequences for the exercise of the associ-
ated right. For example, books, pamphlets, and other written 
texts are things, and the fact that those texts are commodities 
 
 161 Samuelson, 52 Stan L Rev at 1143 (cited in note 149). 
 162 In fact, this risk-spreading is one of the virtues of an eminent domain approach, par-
ticularly as applied to the law enforcement context. See note 233 and accompanying text. 
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has consequences for the ease with which people can exercise 
their rights to speak freely. But it is not the case that speech 
rights themselves are commodified because books are, nor can it 
seriously be suggested that we ought not commodify books lest 
we risk commodifying speech rights.163 The same is true with re-
spect to personal data. But even if one rejects this thing/rights 
distinction, the rights-commodification concern remains, as I 
note above, largely mitigated in the context at issue here. 
Another leading objection to considering data as property is 
more theoretical. It begins by arguing that, even if it were prac-
tically possible to prevent the development of a large market in 
propertized personal data (and to prevent the consequences that 
would follow), coherently doing so, even in a sui generis fashion, 
would require embracing features of ownership that are funda-
mentally inconsistent with what it means to call something 
property.164 Those who take this view begin from the premise 
that “property connotes free alienability” and argue that, once 
one starts down the road of propertizing data, one is either ac-
cepting that a market will arise or, in the interest of avoiding 
that result, proposing limitations on data ownership that lead to 
a type of property that is not truly property.165 This objection 
needs to be taken seriously, not only because it goes to the heart 
of what propertized data could conceivably look like but also be-
cause it applies to the takings-based approach this Article pro-
poses, which imagines a form of property that is not freely  
alienable but that is instead alienable only to a government 
buyer upon the demand of that buyer. Moreover, the specific 
proposal here implicates, as I indicate above, some of its own 
additional restrictions on alienation.166 
 
 163 Indeed, because rights have their own protections in the Constitution, we need 
not avoid propertizing certain things merely to protect associated rights. For example, 
while books are property that the government can generally acquire through the exercise 
of eminent domain, an effort to do so for the purpose of stifling speech would very likely 
violate the First Amendment. 
 164 See Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2091 (cited in note 23) (describing one “anti-
propertization argument” as “rest[ing] on the very idea of free alienability, which is 
considered by many to be an inevitable aspect of property”). See also Margaret Jane 
Radin, Contested Commodities 18 (Harvard 1996) (“Many would say that the question of 
inalienable property is a contradiction in terms.”). 
 165 Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2090 (cited in note 23) (“In their view, once infor-
mation is propertized, it will be difficult to limit an individual’s right to sign away this 
interest.”). See Samuelson, 52 Stan L Rev at 1138–40, 1171 (cited in note 149) (arguing 
that a primary difficulty with a property rights system for information privacy is how to 
“limit[ ] transferability” within a system based on alienability).  
 166 See notes 136–39 and accompanying text. 
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The problem with conceiving of property as being inherently 
about free alienability is that it is just not true, at least not 
when framed in such stark terms.167 As Professor Paul Schwartz 
has explained in the context of information property, “the idea 
that free alienability is an inexorable aspect” of property is “a 
problematic cartoon” that obscures a more complex reality in 
which one possesses property rights in some things without the 
complete ability to alienate those things.168 To take just a few 
examples, consider that rights of first refusal are common and 
enforceable under many circumstances even though they require 
that a property owner permit an identified party (rather than 
anyone else) to buy her property if the party so chooses.169 
Conditions like these thus restrict the owner’s ability to sell her 
property to whomever she wishes, yet they easily coexist with 
calling the property in question “property.”170 Conservation 
easements and historic preservation laws can likewise function 
as restraints on alienability, but it is not suggested that 
property burdened by such restrictions is no longer “property.”171 
Similar restrictions on alienation arise on the intellectual 
property side as well. For example, copyright law provides that a 
grant of copyright is incompletely alienable and is instead 
 
 167 A leading property casebook puts it succinctly: “On most occasions you may sell 
or give away what you own, but not always. . . . Notwithstanding, we still talk about 
what you own as your ‘property.’” Dukeminier, Property at 177 (cited in note 160). See 
also Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for a Public World 
125, 131–32, 139 (Harvard 2018) (noting that “[l]imits can be, and have been, placed on 
the alienability of property in various contexts,” particularly “when fundamental rights 
are at stake, the underlying property is one we wish not to commodify, or if transfers of 
the property are likely to be inefficient or even impossible,” and offering as examples 
blood, historic buildings, human organs, military services, endangered species, and alco-
hol); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum 
L Rev 931, 931 (1985) (arguing that, when “defined as any restriction on the transfera-
bility, ownership, or use of an entitlement,” “inalienability is pervasive in modern, devel-
oped societies, in developing nations, and in the historical past”). 
 168 Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2093 (cited in note 23). See also Moore, 793 P2d at 
509 (Mosk dissenting) (observing that “the same bundle of rights does not attach to all 
forms of property” and that, “[f]or a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or even for-
bids the exercise of certain rights over certain forms of property”). 
 169 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.4, cmt f at 445 (2000). 
 170 Of course, there are circumstances under which the terms of a right of first re-
fusal will be held to be an unreasonable restraint on alienation. See id. But recognizing 
the existence of a reasonable restraint on alienation means accepting that conceiving of 
property as necessarily about free alienability is too simplistic. See Moore, 793 P2d at 
510 n 8 (Mosk dissenting) (using rights of first refusal as a similar example). 
 171 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 3.4, cmt f at 445 (cited in note 
169). See also Rothman, The Right of Publicity at 125 (cited in note 167) (observing that 
historic buildings have limitations placed on their alienability). 
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subject to an author’s own inalienable right to terminate prior 
transfers within a particular period of time.172 It also limits the 
subsequent alienability of certain nonexclusive licenses.173 And 
statutes like the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988174 (VPPA), 
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994175 (DPPA), and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999176 (GLBA) either prohibit 
entities from transferring the information they possess in their 
files or impose conditions on the circumstances under which 
transfers can occur and on those to whom such information can 
be transferred.177 
What these examples demonstrate is that “property is an 
artifact, a human creation that can be, and has been, modified 
in accordance with human needs and values.”178 And once we 
recognize that something can be thought of as property even if it 
is less than fully alienable, the idea of propertizing data ought to 
be less theoretically objectionable.179 It also ought to be “less 
menacing to privacy” because it means that it is plausible to es-
tablish privacy-protecting limitations with respect to the trans-
fers of data even if that data is conceived of as property.180 
For all these reasons, there is a solid theoretical foundation 
for thinking of private data as property, or at least as 
sufficiently property-like. There is also therefore a basis for 
 
 172 See 17 USC §§ 203(a), 304(c). See also Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2092 (cited 
in note 23), citing Marvel Characters, Inc v Simon, 310 F3d 280, 282 (2d Cir 2002). 
 173 See Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An 
Economic Analysis, 22 Berkeley Tech L J 733, 800 (2007). 
 174 Pub L No 100-618, 102 Stat 3195 (1988), codified at 18 USC § 2710. 
 175 Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 2099 (1994), codified at 18 USC § 2721. 
 176 Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999). 
 177 See Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2099–2101 (cited in note 23); 18 USC § 2710(b) 
(VPPA); 18 USC § 2721 (DPPA); 15 USC § 6802 (GLBA). 
 178 Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 Cal L Rev 1517, 1532 (2003). See also 
Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2092 (cited in note 23) (“Property can also take the form of 
incomplete interests and, just as importantly, can serve to structure social relationships. 
. . . The role of alienability in property has always been more complex than [the rigid 
focus on alienability] implies.”). 
 179 Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2126 (cited in note 23) (“[T]he inability to place 
restrictions on one’s ability to trade personal data is an inevitable aspect neither of 
property in general nor of a particular property interest in personal information.”). 
 180 Id at 2094. Even more, as Schwartz observes, insisting upon a conception in 
which personal information is either freely alienable property or not property at all “may 
encourage advocacy of only rearguard policies” that “at best merely lock[ ] in the current 
level of information privacy in the United States”—a level that privacy advocates gener-
ally view as “inadequate.” Id at 2093. As this Article demonstrates, embracing 
propertized data, within limits, can break out of this cycle and improve the level of in-
formation privacy enjoyed by Americans. See Part III.A. 
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understanding the investigatory acquisition of that data—and 
the attendant intrusion upon privacy—as similar to the taking 
of a property right that requires compensation. And in fact, this 
connection between investigatory intrusions and property rights 
like the right to exclude has doctrinal roots too. As the Supreme 
Court has explained, such “property concepts” are instructive in 
“determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests 
protected by [the Fourth] Amendment.”181 After all, the text of 
the Fourth Amendment refers to types of property—“houses, 
papers, and effects”182—and thus reflects the Amendment’s 
historically “close connection to property.”183 The British 
common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted 
likewise expressed the concept of a search as one in which an 
unconsented entry onto property occurred.184 Of course, the 
Court held in Katz v United States185 that a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes also occurs whenever the government 
violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,”186 but the 
Court has also consistently cautioned that the Katz test 
“supplements, rather than displaces,” the traditional property-
based tests.187 Accordingly, principles of property law remain 
quite relevant in assessing and governing the kinds of 
investigatory activity in which the government may engage.188 
For both doctrinal and conceptual reasons, then, it is fair to 
conceive of government access to ISP-held data as a form of 
property intrusion. Two further hurdles warrant brief attention 
at this stage. 
 
 181 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1526, quoting Rakas, 439 US at 143 n 12.  
 182 Jones, 565 US at 404, quoting US Const Amend IV. 
 183 Jones, 565 US at 405. See also Florida v Jardines, 569 US 1, 11 (2013) (discuss-
ing favorably the “traditional property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment” 
and “the Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline”). 
 184 See Jones, 565 US at 404–05, citing Entick v Carrington, 95 Eng Rep 807, 817 
(CP 1765). 
 185 389 US 347 (1967). 
 186 Id at 360 (Harlan concurring). 
 187 Byrd, 138 S Ct at 1526. See also Jones, 565 US at 409; Jardines, 569 US at 10–
11; id at 12 (Kagan concurring); Rakas, 439 US at 143 n 12 (“[B]y focusing on legitimate 
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not 
altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determining the presence or absence of 
the privacy interests protected by that Amendment.”). 
 188 See Rakas, 439 US at 143 n 12 (“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law 
must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of 
real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by 
society.”). See also Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2272 (Gorsuch dissenting) (encouraging liti-
gants to make such property law arguments). 
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One has to do with whether a taking of data for law en-
forcement reasons could be analogous to a taking for a “public 
use,” consistent with the limitations of the Takings Clause. This 
is relevant, not strictly for doctrinal purposes but also for flesh-
ing out the conceptual basis and justification for the analogy. 
Here, too, the fit is a reasonable one.189 To start, recall that the 
Court has held that legislatures possess “broad latitude” to de-
termine what uses justify takings.190 But even beyond the defer-
ence owed to legislative judgments in this arena, understanding 
a taking of data for law enforcement purposes as analogous to a 
public use fits with other purposes that qualify as public uses. 
Indeed, the Court has held that “[p]ublic safety” and “law and 
order” are among “the more conspicuous examples” of the gov-
ernmental aims and public purposes that can be pursued by the 
exercise of eminent domain.191 For example, when the Court con-
cluded that blight reduction constituted a public use, it approv-
ingly cited the legislature’s determination that the neighborhood 
in question had become “injurious to the public [ ] safety.”192 
Likewise, when it concluded that reducing the concentration of 
land ownership was a public use, it again approvingly refer-
enced the fact that the status quo had been “injuring the public 
tranquility and welfare.”193 
Still, it bears noting here that courts have held that 
“[p]roperty seized and retained pursuant to the police power is 
not taken for a ‘public use’ in the context of the Takings Clause,” 
with the result that law enforcement does not regularly owe 
compensation when it seizes property in the course of a criminal 
investigation.194 But this is not because law enforcement is not a 
“public use” as a constitutional matter. Rather, it is because 
“[t]he government may not be required to compensate an owner 
for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the 
exercise of governmental authority other than the power of  
 
 189 See Haig v Agee, 453 US 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no 
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”), quoting 
Aptheker v Secretary of State, 378 US 500, 509 (1964). 
 190 See Kelo, 545 US at 483; note 126 and accompanying text. 
 191 Berman, 348 US at 32. 
 192 Id at 28. 
 193 Midkiff, 467 US at 232. 
 194 AmeriSource Corp v United States, 525 F3d 1149, 1153 (Fed Cir 2008). See also 
Brian Angelo Lee, Emergency Takings, 114 Mich L Rev 391, 399 (2015) (observing that 
property losses resulting from certain police activities are generally noncompensable, 
and criticizing that principle). 
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eminent domain.”195 In other words, if the government’s source of 
authority is outside of the realm of eminent domain, then its ac-
tion is not a taking. But as I discuss above, the proposal here 
would root the government’s power to acquire ISP-held data 
firmly in a takings-based regime and remove it from any other 
source.196 From a doctrinal standpoint, then, there is little diffi-
culty. Conceptually, one might nonetheless query why ISP-held 
data ought to be treated differently than any other information 
and property seized by law enforcement, but the foregoing dis-
cussion illustrates how this sort of information presents unique 
challenges for which the tools and limits employed in ordinary 
investigations have proven particularly unsatisfying and which 
may therefore necessitate unique solutions.197 
The other hurdle is the concern that a takings approach to 
government investigation of ISP-held data would amount to an 
end-run around the Fourth Amendment’s protections. But as I 
discuss above, this type of data is ultimately not well-protected 
by the Fourth Amendment because of the third-party doctrine 
and the rules surrounding administrative subpoenas.198 Of 
course, if the Supreme Court were to dramatically alter either or 
both of these rules, a takings-inspired approach would face dis-
tinct obstacles. But unless and until that happens, the Fourth 
Amendment is essentially out of the picture for much ISP-held 
data. Accordingly, the path is cleared for a regime that borrows 
instead from the principles of property law that animate the 
Takings Clause. 
 
 195 Bennis v Michigan, 516 US 442, 452 (1996). See also AmeriSource Corp, 525 F3d 
at 1153–54. 
 196 See text accompanying notes 133–48. 
 197 See notes 49–63, 69–76, 90–93, 116, and accompanying text. Of course, if there 
are other investigatory contexts in which a similar takings-inspired regime proved ap-
propriate, it would be worth exploring the adaptability of this sort of regime. And indeed, 
given the renewed attention to an orthogonal but related issue—the validity and limits 
of asset forfeiture laws—there may well be some broader rethinking of the rules sur-
rounding law enforcement acquisition of property and the compensation owed for it in 
the coming years. See, for example, Indiana v Timbs, 84 NE3d 1179, 1182–84 (Ind 2017) 
(describing the constitutionality of civil forfeiture laws under the Eighth Amendment), 
cert granted, 138 S Ct 2650 (2018). 
 198 See notes 38–55 and accompanying text (observing the gaps in Fourth 
Amendment protection resulting from the third-party doctrine and the administrative 
search exception). 
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* * * 
The final Part of this Article further fleshes out the poten-
tial upsides of such a regime, engages more deeply with poten-
tial downsides and implementation questions surrounding valu-
ation, and concludes that, while the devil may be in the details, 
the Takings Clause may offer a promising and practical model 
for a statute that can guide the exercise of the government’s 
power and cabin its discretion in this arena. The details of a 
statute like the DTA, and the idea as a whole, therefore warrant 
serious consideration. 
III.  THE PRIVACY UPSIDE 
The normative argument against a statute like the DTA—
against taking data—is fairly straightforward: if the govern-
ment can simply purchase access to ISP-held information, it will 
do so whenever it wants, for whatever ends it wants, largely free 
of restraint or review. Moreover, even if commodifying data is 
not the same as commodifying privacy,199 there is still arguably 
something expressively unsavory about a regime that reduces 
privacy to something the government can pay to overcome. It 
may even risk demeaning privacy and further eroding society’s 
respect for privacy outside the law enforcement context. After 
all, if government teaches by its example that privacy matters 
only insofar as government chooses not to pay an access fee, sub-
jective expectations of privacy may decrease in ways that corpo-
rations, or even friends and neighbors, might exploit.200 
 
 199 See notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 200 See Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis dissenting) 
(“Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example.”). See also Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of 
Privacy Intrusions, 102 Iowa L Rev 1533, 1535 (2017) (“[T]he very act of intrusion sends 
a message about the values society holds dear and the status that particular individuals 
have in society. Thus, certain searches . . . are harmful even if no damning information is 
found.”). That said, this particular ship may have already sailed with respect to the 
commodification of data privacy. See Schwartz, 117 Harv L Rev at 2125 (cited in note 23) 
(“A strong conception of personal data as a commodity is emerging in the United States, 
and individual Americans are already participating in the commodification of their 
personal data.”). Moreover, there is at least some reason to question whether what the 
law permits and what the government does, in fact, alter what people think about 
privacy and the values that are associated with it. Indeed, subjective expectations of 
privacy have been shown to be remarkably resistant to doctrinal shifts in Fourth 
Amendment law. See Matthew B. Kugler and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of 
Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U Chi L Rev 1747, 1750 (2017) (finding that, 
“[t]hough expectations move a little right after a major Supreme Court decision 
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That certainly sounds bad. And if you think it is bad, then 
the message of this Article is not simply that we should refrain 
from enacting a statute like the DTA but rather that there are 
yet additional reasons not to propertize data—reasons that do 
not turn on the specter of a full-fledged market in personal data 
but that arise from the consequences of even a more modest, 
single-purpose intervention.201 Another message might be that 
the potential for government takings of ISP-held information is 
an additional reason for the Supreme Court to overrule or fur-
ther limit its prior decisions with respect to the third-party doc-
trine, the rules surrounding subpoenas, and/or the remedies 
available for violations of the Fourth Amendment.202 
But this last Part explores why this negative reaction is in-
complete and why taking data may in fact represent a promising 
improvement on the status quo—one that could offer greater 
protection for privacy while satisfying law enforcement’s need to 
conduct effective investigations that protect the public. 
A. Compensation’s Effect 
To see how the DTA may better achieve this balance, recall 
the SCA’s current regime. With respect to unopened email that 
is six months old or younger, the statute’s privacy protection is 
as strong as can be: the government needs a warrant. Assuming 
that the Constitution does not require such protection because 
that data has been revealed to a third party, the SCA’s protec-
tion exceeds the constitutional floor.203 Replacing the SCA with 
the DTA would therefore, at first glance, make it marginally 
easier for the government to access this information: instead of 
needing to get a warrant from a judge based on a showing of 
probable cause, the government would need only to make a  
 
substantially changes Fourth Amendment law, within a span of months expectations 
snap right back to where they were beforehand and they remain stable thereafter”). 
 201 See notes 155–60 and accompanying text (exploring consequences of markets in 
personal data). 
 202 See Part I.A. There are, of course, many who question the third-party doctrine on 
other, related bases. See notes 41–48 and accompanying text. See also, for example, 
Friedman, Unwarranted at 234–58 (cited in note 11); Baude and Stern, 129 Harv L Rev 
at 1872 (cited in note 12); Choi, 37 Cardozo L Rev at 217 n 166 (cited in note 5). But see 
generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich L Rev 561 
(2009) (arguing that the third-party doctrine prevents criminals from hiding their activi-
ties and clarifies the extent of Fourth Amendment protection). 
 203 See notes 38–41 and accompanying text. 
118 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:77 
	
declaration of public use and pay compensation before taking 
data held by an ISP.204 
Before turning to why things are more complex than that 
first glance, recall that all the rest of the ISP-held information—
the content of unopened email more than six months old; the 
content of opened email of any age; and noncontent data like a 
user’s name, address, connection and usage records, phone 
number, network address, service contract, payment infor-
mation, sites visited, and addresses emailed—is offered little 
protection by the SCA.205 At most, the government needs only to 
give a judge reason to believe that the information is relevant to 
an investigation; for some of this data, the government can even 
access it with a mere administrative subpoena.206 With this low 
baseline, the worst-case scenario for the DTA is that it swaps 
one largely unprotective regime with another. 
Of course, if the DTA makes no improvement to the protec-
tion afforded to a wide swath of ISP-held data and actually risks 
eroding the protection afforded to the rest of it, it is hard to see 
any upside. But that diagnosis assumes that taking such data 
under the DTA creates a merely procedural hurdle—the filing of 
a declaration of public use and the rest of the process set out in 
the statute. Not so. Rather, taking ISP-held data under the DTA 
would add two important substantive hurdles: the agency would 
have to pay for the data out of its budget, and the agency would 
have to report to congressional appropriators and to the public 
about precisely how much data it purchased and what investiga-
tory and law enforcement benefits those purchases yielded.207 
Together, the obligations to pay for investigatory searches of 
ISP-held data and to justify those purchases to Congress would 
do more to force agencies to internalize and consider the privacy-
related costs of their activities than administrative subpoenas 
do—and perhaps even more than warrants do. Even warrants 
place nearly all the costs of the privacy intrusion on the person 
whose privacy is being intruded on. Besides the costs attendant 
to the applicable judicial processes, which are generally low, the 
 
 204 Of course, if the Fourth Amendment does require a warrant for such content 
data, see notes 41 and 89, the DTA would not apply to that data and would instead apply 
only to the data that is outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection. 
 205 But see note 88 and accompanying text (noting doubts as to the constitutionality 
of the SCA’s sub–warrant requirements for content data). 
 206 See notes 80–86 and 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 207 See notes 136–45 and accompanying text. 
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government faces no costs at all.208 It matters not at all whether 
the investigation yields useful information, and thanks to the 
doctrine of qualified immunity, as I discuss above, nearly any 
defects in the government’s investigatory process will result in 
no penalty beyond any evidence acquired being excluded at  
trial.209 And even if exclusion were a meaningful cost for the gov-
ernment—which is far from clear—the good faith exception 
means that defects in a warrant or subpoena might not even re-
sult in exclusion.210 Accordingly, the government perceives sig-
nificant benefits from its investigatory activities when its efforts 
lead to convictions or thwarted criminal activity and, at worst, 
fairly neutral outcomes when they do not.211 The result familiar 
to basic law and economics scholarship is that the government 
will overinvestigate relative to an efficient baseline.212 
The innovation of the DTA would be to change all of this 
and force investigatory agencies to pay—and to pay up front—in 
terms of money for the costs of the information they seek to 
acquire from ISPs, and in terms of political capital when that 
money is perceived by legislative overseers and by the public to 
have been wasted. Moreover, because the costs faced by the 
agencies would reflect the fair market value of the particular 
 
 208 See note 24 (describing the ease with which government agencies may acquire 
warrants). Professors Max Minzner and Christopher Anderson have demonstrated that 
law enforcement officers are sensitive to costs when conducting warranted wiretaps, but 
wiretaps are a particularly expensive type of search. Max Minzner and Christopher M. 
Anderson, Do Warrants Matter?, 9 Rev L & Econ 169, 191–92 (2013). As they explain, 
the Wiretap Act requires that recorded calls be  
“minimized,” or continuously monitored in real time so that monitoring of a 
particular transmission can be stopped once it is determined to not relate to 
criminal activity. As a result, any time that a call is recorded by law enforce-
ment, agents must be available to simultaneously listen to the call as it occurs.  
Id at 172 (citation omitted). Needless to say, execution of an ordinary search warrant is 
far less labor intensive than that and, accordingly, far less costly. Note as well that I am 
assuming a certain baseline of fixed labor costs that the government will invest, more or 
less, in a particular investigation regardless of the method or form of legal authorization 
for that investigation. My focus is on the marginal costs that particular threshold au-
thorizations—warrant, subpoena, taking, etc.—add to the mix. 
 209 See note 59 and accompanying text. 
 210 See notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
 211 As Professor Barry Friedman put it, law enforcement presently gets to “writ[e] 
its own blank checks,” secure in the knowledge that other people bear the burdens. 
Friedman, Unwarranted at 257 (cited in note 11). 
 212 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 56–57 (Wolters 
Kluwer 9th ed 2014) (exploring the socially inefficient consequences of government not 
internalizing the costs of its behavior). 
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information being acquired,213 those costs would necessarily be 
set at the retail level by the market rather than, as they 
effectively are now, at the wholesale level by Congress. In 
contrast to the inherent difficulties that arise when a legislature 
tries to draw lines in this context, the DTA would entail little 
risk of categorical over- or underprotection of privacy.214 Instead, 
the costs faced by law enforcement would reflect, at a more 
finely calibrated level, the privacy actually intruded on by law 
enforcement activity. The decisions that law enforcement would 
make based on those costs would accordingly be better tailored 
and would strike a superior balance, having emerged from a 
more accurate accounting of the costs and benefits in a given 
circumstance. In sum, we would have (more) economically 
rational decision-making, (more) transparency, and (more) 
democratic accountability: the very things policing has been said 
to be missing.215 
If the result were a complete internalization of the precise 
privacy costs of these agencies’ activities at a case-by-case level, 
agencies would engage in an efficient level of privacy-intrusive 
investigations. But even if the DTA would not lead agencies to 
perfectly internalize all of the costs of their data-related 
investigatory activities—a likely impossible goal—it would do so 
at least to some degree. We would thus expect to see at least a 
marginal reduction in the amount of overinvestigation and 
therefore a marginal improvement in the protection of privacy 
both quantitatively and qualitatively—not only relative to the 
SCA’s regime but, again, even relative to a warrant 
requirement. 
This account is well rooted in the standard efficiency ra-
tionale for compensating takings in the ordinary context—
takings involving condemnations of land for the creation of 
parks and the like. As former Judge Richard Posner and  
Professors Frank Michelman, Michael Heller, James Krier, and 
many others have argued, if the government did not have to 
 
 213 See note 119 and accompanying text. 
 214 See notes 13–15, 114–15 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacies of 
either/or privacy protection legislation). 
 215 Friedman, Unwarranted at 46 (cited in note 11) (explaining that one of the big-
gest challenges in regulating policing, especially with respect to new technology, is that 
far too much of it is “shrouded in secrecy to a degree that is often difficult to compre-
hend” and arguing that transparency is “essential”); id at 71 (emphasizing that cost-
benefit analysis is “one of the primary tools of good government” that is sorely lacking in 
policing). 
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compensate property owners for land taken by eminent domain, 
the government would take whatever property and whatever re-
sources maximized its own benefits, regardless of the costs to 
the dispossessed property owners and regardless of the costs to 
society at large.216 In other words, government “would not feel 
incentives, created by the price system, to use those resources 
efficiently.”217 The Takings Clause’s compensation requirement 
is thus understood to lead government to make efficient takings 
decisions—to take property only when the public benefits of the 
taking outweigh the burdens and costs on the private owner. 
That, as promised, is how a significant tool of property law 
strikes the kind of balance that has proven elusive when it 
comes to investigations of ISP-held data. Adapting that tool to 
transform searches of ISP-held data into endeavors that must be 
similarly compensated should be expected to have the same 
result: government would make efficient investigatory takings 
decisions that take proper account of the privacy interests in a 
given circumstance. At a minimum, government would make 
decisions that are more efficient and more conscious of the 
privacy costs than those it currently makes under the SCA or 
the Fourth Amendment in the absence of a compensation 
requirement. 
This line of argument was, however, called into question in 
a seminal article by Professor Levinson, which argued that gov-
ernment does not internalize costs like a private firm does, as 
would be necessary for the standard account to hold.218 Levinson 
 
 216 See, for example, Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 56–57 (cited in note 212); 
Michael A. Heller and James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of 
Takings, 112 Harv L Rev 997, 1001 (1999); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: 
Constitutional Rights as Public Goods, 72 Denver U L Rev 859, 882–83 (1995); Robert C. 
Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 Yale L J 385, 
420 (1977); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1218 (1967). To 
be clear, however, I do not mean to suggest that law enforcement responds only to 
budgetary constraints. See Ronit Levine-Schnur and Gideon Parchomovsky, Is the 
Government Fiscally Blind? An Empirical Examination of the Effect of the Compensation 
Requirement on Eminent-Domain Exercises, 45 J Legal Stud 437, 463 (2016) (providing 
data that “call[s] into question” the theory that officials “are exclusively motivated by 
budgetary constraints” when making takings decisions). In fact, I do not mean to imply 
any single explanation for government action. Rather, I simply mean to suggest that law 
enforcement in fact responds to budgetary constraints, as well as related accountability 
constraints, and that a regime that leverages those constraints would ultimately be, for 
lack of a better word, marginally more constraining. 
 217 Heller and Krier, 112 Harv L Rev at 999 (cited in note 216). 
 218 Levinson, 67 U Chi L Rev at 359 (cited in note 26). 
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explained that the very incentive effects just set out rely on the 
assumptions that, first, “government will not take full account of 
the costs of takings unless it is forced to pay money from the 
treasury,”219 and second, that forcing government to pay in such 
a manner would in fact force government to internalize the costs 
of its takings and to make “socially optimal choices” with respect 
to takings.220 These assumptions, Levinson argued, are funda-
mentally flawed because government does not care about finan-
cial outflows or inflows qua financial outflows and inflows. Ra-
ther, government responds only to political incentives, and while 
those political incentives may be “causally connected to social 
costs and benefits, [ ] they are not the same thing.”221 And more 
damning still, Levinson showed that that causal connection is 
indeed quite complex and indeterminate.222 
It is no understatement to say that Levinson’s argument 
“revolutionized” the standard account of government cost-
internalization and has led scholars to rethink the doctrines 
surrounding compensation for both constitutional torts and tak-
ings.223 But, for four reasons, Levinson’s quite fair observations 
do not ultimately undermine the argument that a takings-based 
regime for law enforcement acquisition of ISP-held data, under 
the circumstances I outline here, could result in an increased 
degree of privacy protection and a step toward a more efficient 
level of data searches. 
First, much of what Levinson had to say is about the 
incentives felt by elected officials, not heads of administrative 
agencies and certainly not more junior bureaucrats constrained 
by their departments’ budgets. At times, he said as much 
outright.224 At other times, the limitation was baked into the 
argument. For example, Levinson accurately undermined the 
analogy between private firms and elected officials by explaining 
that, because investors in a private firm have largely 
 
 219 Id at 349. 
 220 Id at 347. 
 221 Id at 357. 
 222 Levinson, 67 U Chi L Rev at 357 (cited in note 26). 
 223 Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, 
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U Pa J Const L 797, 830 (2007) (“It is perhaps only 
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governmental damages liability”). 
 224 Levinson, 67 U Chi L Rev at 361 (cited in note 26) (“[T]he accountability argu-
ment starts from the understanding that elected officials make decisions based solely on 
political costs and benefits.”) (emphasis added). See also id at 363, 374, 377. 
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homogeneous incentives to maximize value, they force the 
principals of the firm to pursue that shared cost-minimizing, 
profit-maximizing goal.225 By contrast, citizens as a group have 
no a priori preference for their representatives to pursue any 
particular goal, let alone a cost-reduction one.226 As a result, the 
claim that elected officials will evaluate costs in the same way 
as a private firm was based on a flawed assumption—and that is 
on top of the fact that those officials are less faithful agents than 
are firm managers because the mechanisms of both selection 
and control are more attenuated in their electoral context.227 
But it is not at all clear that this line of argument applies to 
bureaucrats with the same force with which it applies to elected 
officials. For one thing, bureaucrats in a particular agency share 
that agency’s relatively more homogeneous goal and therefore 
aim to avoid costly expenditures that detract from that goal.228 
And while they may disagree about specific priorities or about 
the best ways to achieve them—just like in firms—the universe 
of interests is narrowed substantially. The list of possible maxi-
mands is therefore narrowed as well, which makes it at least 
marginally more possible for an agency head to identify and 
maximize some particular “value” in the same way that private 
firms do with profit. As a result, whereas Levinson was right 
that elected officials may not care about how money gets spent, 
the same cannot be said quite so easily with respect to bureau-
cratic actors.229 Even if the analogy to firms is imperfect, then, 
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one need not be quite so fatalistic about the potential for an 
agency to be made to internalize costs at least to some degree.230 
To be sure, Levinson does acknowledge that bureaucrats 
behave “quite differently” from “vote-maximizing legislators” but 
concludes that they do so in ways that are ultimately too inde-
terminate to predict.231 Drawing on Professor William 
Niskanen’s classic rational choice model, which assumes that 
the appropriator in charge of the agency’s budget knows the 
agency’s output but not its costs, Levinson explains how a bu-
reaucrat’s desire to maximize her agency’s budget could result in 
the bureaucrat spending money either unwisely (so as to lead 
the appropriator to see low output and to raise the budget in re-
sponse) or wisely (so as to avoid giving the appropriator the im-
pression that the agency is a waste and should have its funding 
reduced).232 It is certainly fair enough to note that predicting ex-
actly what the bureaucrat will do in order to maximize value is 
not a simple task, even assuming that the value being maxim-
ized is merely budgetary and not mission-oriented. But to say as 
much is to concede that, unlike an elected official, a bureaucrat 
is trying to maximize a value, and minimize a cost, that is not 
only political. 
Moreover, the structure contemplated by the DTA undoes 
one of Niskanen and Levinson’s core assumptions: that the ap-
propriator does not know the agency’s cost schedule. Under the 
DTA, the investigating agency would have to pay for the data 
out of its budget and would be obligated to give Congress reports 
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of what the agency spent on data takings, how many takings it 
made, and what law enforcement goals were advanced as a re-
sult. It hardly requires a great leap of faith to expect that a bu-
reaucrat who consistently fails to make wise investments with 
her limited budget will either change tactics of her own accord 
or be prompted to change them by the appropriator. After all, it 
seems a perfectly fair assumption that Congress would prefer to 
see money spent on successes rather than on failures. Because 
Congress will possess the knowledge of how that money got 
spent, an agency with more failures than successes would natu-
rally face budgetary repercussions. And a smart agency head 
would incorporate the prospect of having to divulge such infor-
mation to Congress into her plans and be motivated to avoid 
those repercussions in the first place.233 
To take a simple example from the law enforcement 
context—one that is a few steps outside the realm of the DTA 
but that will serve to illustrate the point—imagine that a police 
department that engaged in stop-and-frisk investigatory tactics 
had to pay the person stopped and then report to the local 
government how much money had been spent and whether the 
stops led to arrests.234 We know that stop-and-frisk has a 
remarkably low success rate,235 but a big part of why similar 
practices persist (where they have not been enjoined) is 
undoubtedly because the costs of the erroneous stops are borne 
only by the people who are stopped, and these people lack 
political power and/or are too diffuse to harness that power.236 If 
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police departments paid for every stop and then had to justify 
those unproductive expenses to their appropriators and political 
superiors, someone would surely start asking whether all the 
misses were worth the cost.237 And those doing the asking might 
even start to come from more politically powerful groups.238 The 
DTA would accomplish the same goal, replacing the status 
quo—which does not have this internalize-and-justify effect—
with a regime that does.239 
Second, even setting to one side these differences between 
elected officials and bureaucrats and taking Levinson’s argu-
ment on its own terms, financial costs often do translate into the 
kinds of political costs Levinson said government is attuned to. 
When financial outlays are directed toward expenses that bring 
no social benefit—and that therefore cannot be exploited for po-
litical benefit—they are at best useless for politicians.240 Even 
worse, in a world of finite resources, such useless expenses carry 
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large opportunity costs: every dollar spent on a program that is 
not beneficial or effective at advancing some political goal is a 
dollar not spent on a program that is beneficial or that could 
have advanced a political goal.241 
Professor Lawrence Rosenthal persuasively made this same 
point with respect to government damages liability. If govern-
ment were truly not attuned to costs, as in the most extreme 
version of Levinson’s argument, then it would be largely indif-
ferent to such liability.242 One would therefore expect govern-
ment to devote next to no resources toward minimizing such lia-
bility; if liability creates no cognizable costs, then government 
would have no reason to minimize those costs, let alone divert 
resources from other politically beneficial programs to do so. 
And yet, Rosenthal pointed out, governments go to great lengths 
to enact governmental tort immunity legislation despite the fact 
that there is no obvious lobby in favor of such legislation.243 The 
conclusion must therefore be that immunity legislation itself 
confers political benefits, which means that liability “exacts a 
political price.”244 
The point is ultimately a fairly intuitive one. When a person 
is observed trying to avoid a particular outcome, one concludes 
that that person perceives the outcome to impose costs on 
herself. Whether those costs are financial, reputational, 
political, or otherwise—or whether one type of cost creates 
another type of cost—is largely beside the point.245 And we 
perceive government trying to avoid incurring the very sorts of 
costs that Levinson said governments do not internalize. The 
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natural conclusion is that government does in fact internalize 
those costs even if it is not doing so in the financial way that 
firms do and, instead, is doing so only because those costs are 
transformed into political ones. 
Accordingly, we can say that government will generally be 
deterred from taking a particular action when the political costs 
of that action outweigh the political benefits. The status quo im-
poses almost no political costs on agencies that use the legal 
tools at their disposal to access ISP-held data. For all the rea-
sons discussed above, the result is likely to be overuse of those 
tools and, in turn, excessive intrusions on privacy. By contrast, 
legislation like the DTA would ramp up the costs associated 
with using those tools—whether one calls the costs financial or 
financial-cum-political—and thus bring their use closer to some 
level of social optimality. 
Third, and closely related, widespread or fruitless data tak-
ings under the DTA are unlikely to go unnoticed by the general 
public. One critique of the story of political costs I discuss 
above—both those that arise as a result of bureaucrats who 
might care about how money gets spent and those that arise as 
a result of the appropriations and oversight relationship be-
tween agencies and Congress—is that the public will not care 
about the practice or the expense and that the resulting political 
pressure would therefore be low. But the attention associated 
with takings of ISP-held data would likely be particularly  
salient because that scheme would touch simultaneously on pub-
lic sensitivities surrounding privacy—like those animated by the 
Apple-FBI dispute I discuss above246—and on public sensitivities 
surrounding eminent domain. 
Indeed, at a minimum, if the potential for public outcry 
based on privacy sensitivities already limits the government’s 
reach under the status quo, the DTA would do nothing to erode 
that limitation. But the DTA can go even further because, as the 
takings literature has long recognized, the public’s reaction to 
eminent domain can be especially powerful as well. For example, 
Rosenthal has argued that the Takings Clause’s “compensation 
requirement imposes political discipline well in excess of that 
usually operating in the political arena.”247 Professor Richard 
Epstein has likewise argued in the zoning context that regulation 
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is “a lot easier to impose than outright takings” because, when 
regulating, “the government does not have to conduct a parcel-
by-parcel condemnation paid for out of public revenues.”248 If you 
do not believe that the latter takings approach creates political 
opposition, Epstein says, “just think of the furious public re-
sponse to Kelo [v City of New London249],” the 2005 case in which 
the Supreme Court held that private property could be con-
demned and transferred to another private party if the transfer 
is in furtherance of economic development.250 Opposition to the 
very idea of such an exercise of eminent domain was so wide-
spread that all but a handful of states amended their eminent 
domain laws to prohibit the kind of takings that Kelo held were 
constitutionally permissible.251 Writing in the New York Times, 
Adam Liptak called the public reaction “a revolt” from  
“Democrats and Republicans, liberals and libertarians, and  
everyone betwixt and between.”252 
Of course, the taking at issue in Kelo became uniquely  
salient largely after the Court issued its decision. I do not mean 
to suggest that every individual taking spurs the same ferocity, 
though there remains some empirical and anecdotal evidence 
suggesting as much.253 But all the same, there is reason to  
 
 248 Richard A. Epstein, The Unfinished Business of Horne v. Department of  
Agriculture, 10 NYU J L & Liberty 734, 753 (2016). 
 249 545 US 469 (2005). 
 250 Epstein, 10 NYU J L & Liberty at 753. See also Kelo, 545 US at 483–84. 
 251 See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years after Kelo, 125 Yale L J F 82, 84–88 
(2015) (cataloging the forty-four states that changed their laws after Kelo to tighten the 
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(Perma archive unavailable) (noting that “[n]o other Supreme Court decision in all of 
American history has generated so much state legislation” and that “over 80% of the 
public disapproved of the ruling,” but arguing that most of the flurry of new state 
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 252 Adam Liptak, Case Won on Appeal (to Public) (NY Times, July 30, 2006), online 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/weekinreview/30liptak.html (visited Oct 22, 2018) 
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Opposition to Eminent Domain, 4 J L & Courts 339, 359 (2016) (reporting survey and  
experimental data showing that Americans generally oppose eminent domain); Logan 
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(Wash Post, Oct 12, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/10/12/trumps-border-wall-would-become-a-lot-more-unpopular-if-he-tried-to-
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believe that coupling invasions of privacy with invasions of 
property would meaningfully amplify the political costs associ-
ated with investigations of ISP-held data. After all, the required 
compensation for the taking is owed immediately and predicta-
bly, which means that “the political impact of compensation is 
unusually direct, immediate, and predictable.”254 Because it is 
difficult for government to evade or to mask the financial out-
flow associated with takings, both the expense and the public 
accounting of opportunity costs—the prospect of what else that 
money could have been spent on—can quickly become political 
facts that get weaponized by opposition or other interest 
groups.255 
Fourth and finally, the political toxicity of takings makes at 
least some scholars concerned that the government’s obligation 
to pay compensation overdeters action.256 Professor Bethany  
Berger, for example, has examined the effect of state statutes 
requiring compensation for losses caused by land use regulation 
and concluded that the result of them all was to “simply shut 
regulation down.”257 For example, Oregon’s Measure 37, a ballot 
initiative that required local governments to compensate prop-
erty owners for losses in value caused by land use restrictions 
enacted subsequent to acquisition, led most local governments to 
simply waive the relevant restrictions with respect to the  
affected parcels.258 Paying compensation, the localities ex-
plained, was simply a bad use of limited funds.259 The same pat-
tern emerged under similar regimes in Florida and Arizona.260 
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Of course, the subject of this Article is not regulatory tak-
ings, but the lesson applies all the same: governments and agen-
cies with limited resources acting in an area of high political sa-
lience can be expected to react to a compensation requirement 
with at least some degree of hesitation—to perceive some degree 
of deterrence—over and above that which would have existed in 
the absence of a compensation requirement.261 Insofar as the ex-
periences in Oregon, Florida, and Arizona suggest that the de-
gree of deterrence may even be excessive, that is simply further 
evidence that a flat-out rejection of the idea that government in-
ternalizes costs in this context is mistaken. 
But as for the countervailing concern that a regime like the 
DTA could similarly overdeter, it seems unlikely that the gov-
ernment would drop serious, major investigations. Instead, the 
government’s desire not to miss out on catching a potential ter-
rorist or major criminal figure or fraudster (and incurring the 
attendant political costs) could be expected to meet the govern-
ment’s desire not to misallocate resources toward fruitless data 
takings and privacy intrusions (and to avoid the attendant polit-
ical costs) and produce a relatively balanced posture toward in-
vestigative takings.262 
B. Measuring Compensation 
With all of this in mind, the next obstacle to overcome with 
respect to identifying the upside of a regime like the DTA has to 
do with the level of compensation—how much the government 
would have to pay for a particular slice of ISP-held data—and its 
deterrent or efficiency-promoting effect. Generally speaking, just 
compensation is the fair market value of the property taken, as-
sessed at the time of the taking.263 One might therefore make two 
 
 261 See Hanoch Dagan, Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 
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sation based on fair market value will often be inadequate. See, for example, Lee Anne 
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objections: first, that measuring the value of this kind of data will 
not be easy to do, and second, that even if doing so were feasible, 
the value would be so low that the compensation owed by the gov-
ernment would be too little to have a meaningful privacy-
promoting effect. This final Section tackles both objections. 
As for the first objection, there are a number of ways one 
might measure the value of the privacy stored in ISP-held data. 
There are already fairly widespread markets in some personal 
data like consumer information—including browsing histories.264 
The prices generated in those markets could provide a useful 
starting point. Valuation methods under the DTA could then be 
further refined to reflect the DTA’s operating context. To start, 
imagine that a particular piece of data is a potentially inculpa-
tory piece of evidence in the investigation of a significant crime, 
terrorist enterprise, or civil fraud. There are, of course, any 
number of people who would want that sort of information not to 
be private—who, in other words, would pay to purchase and lift 
from the data its private quality: the investigating governmental 
entities, to be sure, but also the press, amateur sleuths, victims’ 
families, academic researchers, or even museums and libraries 
interested in archiving a potential piece of history. There is also, 
of course, the set of people who would like to keep their own in-
formation private.265 All of those people are potential buyers in a 
hypothetical market for the information. A sense of the data’s 
value can therefore be developed in the same way that value is 
measured for property in the ordinary takings context: by com-
paring what those other market participants have paid in the 
past to uncover similar private information.266 For example, 
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while governmental entities have not previously been made to 
pay in this context, other entities like museums or collectors  
often do pay to acquire historically significant items that might 
be reasonably analogous.267 And once the DTA’s regime picked 
up speed and experience, courts and investigating entities would 
have little trouble arriving at valuations based on similar past 
DTA-based acquisitions. 
Granted, this might be easier said than done. But the DTA 
would hardly be the first context in which agencies and courts 
have encountered difficult-to-quantify values, so more than a 
few solutions have been developed. For example, executive 
branch agencies are all required by executive order to undertake 
cost-benefit analyses for new regulatory actions.268 Given the 
fact that certain benefits resist ready quantification—for exam-
ple, the aesthetic value of clear air—regulators have turned to 
other “appropriate proxies that simulate market exchange.”269 
One proxy “widely considered the best” uses revealed prefer-
ence methods.270 Revealed preference methods estimate the  
value of something by observing people’s “actual behavior in 
market or market-like settings” that are roughly analogous.271 
So in the context of the DTA, even if we cannot measure the 
value of the private quality of a particular piece of data, we 
might be able to observe the lengths to which similarly situated 
people go in order to keep private similar information and 
measure the costs of that activity.272 For example, we could draw 
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inferences from the consumer market for privacy technologies 
like two-factor authentication, thumbprint or facial scanners, 
and the like. Or we might observe how much various actors gen-
erally pay to make public documents and information with simi-
lar potential and draw inferences from that behavior. Agencies 
and experts would be able to further refine these practices as 
they gained experience with the statute’s scheme.273 
Another common method is just to ask people how much 
they would be willing to pay for a particular outcome or benefit 
or to avoid a particular harm.274 To continue with the clear air 
example noted above, when the EPA considered a proposal to 
regulate emissions from a power plant near the Grand Canyon, 
one of the inputs for its cost-benefit analysis was naturally the 
aesthetic benefit of clear air over the Grand Canyon.275 There is 
no market in clear air, so the EPA estimated the value of clear 
air by showing people photos of the Grand Canyon in different 
conditions and asking them how much they would pay to enjoy a 
particular level of visibility on their visits.276 It would not be 
hard to adapt that kind of study to the context of the DTA. The 
same kind of hypothetical market participants listed above could 
be surveyed and asked how much they would pay to either 
acquire or keep private information similar to the subject of a 
particular DTA taking.277 
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fect information, cognitive biases, and difficulty predicting how particular events or con-
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2019] Taking Data 135 
	
In fact, scholars have already begun to conduct precisely  
these kinds of surveys, and while they are focused largely on the 
willingness-to-pay-for-privacy side rather than on the willingness-
to-pay-for-acquisition side, it would not be hard to ask those ques-
tions too.278 Many of these surveys have found, however, that, 
“when asked to pay” for privacy, people are “strikingly stingy.”279 
Studies have found, for example, that people are willing to pay no 
more than $15 per year to avoid automated content analysis of 
email messages.280 
Findings like these give rise to the second objection: even if 
it were easy to arrive at a measurement of the value of the rele-
vant data’s private nature, the price will be too low to effectively 
deter the government. There are a few key points to remember 
here, however. First, the question under a takings regime is not 
asked generally (“How much would you pay to keep/how much 
would you accept to sell your property?”) but specifically (“How 
much would you pay to keep/how much would you accept to sell 
this property?”).281 When the subject is tangible property, the 
specific question ought to yield a lower price than the general 
one because people will rationally aggregate their property  
values when answering the general question. But the opposite 
effect is at least possible when the subject is personal data. After 
all, people may not remember each and every embarrassing 
website they have visited and so may offer a low price when an-
swering the general question, but once confronted with even a 
single embarrassing piece of data, they may put a higher price 
on that information.282 Further, even if people are relatively 
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comfortable with exposure of their personal data to automated 
systems, they may feel considerably different about exposure of 
that same data to actual human beings.283 So while it may well 
be that some would feel just as cavalier either way, there is at 
least some reason to believe that, when primed to focus on a 
specific salient piece of information that would be exposed to an 
actual person, many would offer higher estimates of their will-
ingness to pay.284 Add in the fact that the information would be 
exposed in a personally identifiable fashion to the government, 
and people might really begin to feel differently.285 
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This valuation reasoning applies all the same even if the 
data taken is merely a duplication and not the original.286 One 
might argue that no compensation would be owed under those 
circumstances, but that claim overlooks the fact that, 
ultimately, the value being taken is the private quality of the 
data. In other words, when the government copies personal data 
for its own use, it interferes with the owner’s rights to exclude 
others from that data and to control the use of that data just as 
if it took the original.287 So even though the government does not 
eliminate the owner’s right to possess the data when it does not 
take the original, it still invades some of the owner’s core 
property rights. And when the data in question is valuable to its 
owner or creator precisely because it is private, the loss of 
privacy that comes from the loss of the right to exclude is 
especially important.288 In fact, recognizing as much is another 
advantage of a takings-inspired approach like the DTA. In the 
Fourth Amendment context, a seizure occurs only when the 
government has made “[a] meaningful interference with an 
individual’s possessory interest” in the property in question.289 
On that theory, the government’s copying of computer data 
might not implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment at 
all.290 An approach like the DTA, by contrast, would recognize 
that the data’s value is primarily its private nature and would 
therefore put a price—and thus a limitation—on the 
government’s ability to copy it. 
The foregoing has focused on the market price from the 
perspective of a creator of data, but there is also reason to 
believe that the opposite perspective—that of potential buyers—
would likewise generate significant prices. For example, given 
the lengths to which people and the press have gone to find and 
publicize them, and the urgency with which they have been 
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reported, the imputed market value of President Donald 
Trump’s tax returns or of evidence of any communications 
between him or his staff and Russian operatives or businessmen 
is likely quite high indeed.291 And that is even without any other 
evidence that such documents would ultimately reveal any 
crime to have been committed. 
Finally, even if the magnitude of the compensation owed to 
an individual were low, that would not mean that the govern-
ment would avoid facing a meaningful constraint on its behav-
ior. In many circumstances—indeed, perhaps the most vexing 
for privacy advocates—the government may not know precisely 
who its target is and so will instead set out to obtain hundreds, 
thousands, or even more pieces of data before filtering them to 
find what it needs.292 Each individual person whose information 
was collected in this sort of “big data” sweep might not receive 
very much compensation if the fair market value of her data 
turned out to be low, but the aggregation of all of that compen-
sation would translate to a much heftier bill for the investigat-
ing entity. And it is from that perspective that the constraint 
would emerge—much as it does in the context of, for example, 
class actions involving a large number of small claims.293 
For all of these reasons, there is at least some reason to be-
lieve that the costs to government that would attend the acquisi-
tion of this kind of data in a takings-based regime would create 
a meaningful deterrent effect for law enforcement and result in 
some degree of privacy promotion. There is also, however, an-
other concern from the opposite direction. One might say that 
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this kind of data may well be valuable—too valuable, in fact. In 
other words, the market might price information that relates to 
a particularly major investigation higher than it does more quo-
tidian information. From one perspective, one would desire the 
opposite effect: make it cheaper for government to access infor-
mation closely and obviously related to major investigations 
while making it more expensive for government to access infor-
mation that is much farther afield. One might worry that  
government would shift toward the low-hanging fruit and be 
more apt to acquire such run-of-the-mill information (or, more 
precisely, less likely to be deterred from acquiring it). But, for all 
the reasons I discuss above, it is unlikely that government 
would forgo the expensive yet fruitful investigation and instead 
engage in many cheap yet fruitless investigations.294 Instead, the 
more likely effect is that agencies would marshal their limited 
resources and save their money for the expensive yet fruitful in-
vestigations by not wasting it on cheap yet fruitless ones. In  
other words, increasing the cost of the investigations that are 
most central to the government’s mission and that are most po-
litically salient could be expected to decrease the extent to which 
government engages in unrelated investigations that are  
unlikely to produce actionable information.295 
Finally, if these arguments about the government facing a 
meaningful level of compensation are unsatisfying, one solution 
would be to embed into the DTA the equivalent of a liquidated 
damages clause: a statutorily set minimum amount the govern-
ment must pay as compensation. Congress has done exactly this 
in other privacy statutes. For example, the Video Privacy  
Protection Act and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, both dis-
cussed above, provide that the court may award “actual  
damages but not less than liquidated damages in an amount of 
$2,500.”296 Similarly, the Cable Communications Policy Act,297 a 
statute that protects cable subscriber information, provides that 
a court can award “liquidated damages computed at the rate of 
$100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000, whichever is 
 
 294 See notes 235–62 and accompanying text. 
 295 Another solution to this concern would be to embed in the statute clearly deline-
ated circumstances or triggers under which the data-taking power could be exercised. 
See note 141 (addressing this possibility). Rigorous legislative oversight and public re-
porting would likely go a long way toward ameliorating this concern as well. 
 296 18 USC §§ 2710(c)(2), 2724(b)(1). 
 297 Pub L No 98-549, 98 Stat 2794 (1984), codified at 47 USC § 521 et seq. 
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higher.”298 For the purposes of the DTA, Congress—informed by 
experts—could make its best judgment about what minimum 
amount would lead investigating agencies to adequately inter-
nalize the costs of their privacy intrusions. To be clear, relative 
to market pricing, this would generally be a second-best solution 
in terms of optimizing the government’s investigatory activity. 
But it could at least be a starting point for further tinkering. 
And if set even close to correctly, it would represent an im-
provement upon the status quo. 
After all, keep in mind that the status quo imposes on gov-
ernment nearly no costs at all with respect to investigating ISP-
held data. Recall that the SCA empowers government to access 
this sort of data without a warrant in many cases.299 And the 
administrative costs associated with securing subpoenas or 
court orders—even more so than those associated with war-
rants—are low.300 But even if those administrative costs were 
meaningful, a data taking would be accompanied by administra-
tive costs of its own too. The important difference is that the 
DTA would add the costs of compensation. And even if the com-
pensation associated with data acquisition were small or imper-
fectly set, it would still be greater than zero. Requiring the pay-
ment of such compensation should, therefore, be expected to 
throw some sand into the gears and, at least relative to the base-
line, introduce some deterrent effect.301 
CONCLUSION 
The government’s power to intrude upon citizens’ privacy in 
the course of investigating potentially unlawful and dangerous 
conduct is an awesome one. How it ought to be exercised and 
channeled in the digital age is a question of central importance 
that is actively debated by policymakers, lawyers, judges, 
scholars, and citizens alike. Lost among all the various 
proposals in that debate, however, is the fact that this elusive 
balance between private burdens and public benefits has 
already been struck to at least some degree of satisfaction in an 
 
 298 47 USC § 551(f)(2)(A). 
 299 See note 86 and accompanying text. 
 300 See notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 301 Of course, if it turns out that requiring compensation throws little to no sand in 
the gears, that may be a sign that privacy is not as highly valued as we think, which 
would itself represent something of a solution to the struggle between privacy and law 
enforcement. 
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analogous context: the government’s power under the Takings 
Clause. There, too, the government has the ability to interfere 
with citizens’ privacy—including the enjoyment and possession 
of their private property—for the public good. But the fact that 
the government must compensate people for the property it 
takes—and the fact that that compensation turns on the value of 
the specific property being taken—disciplines the exercise of this 
otherwise wide-ranging ability to intrude at the government’s 
own pleasure. 
This Article has, therefore, explored how this area of 
property law might inspire a different kind of statutory 
framework for the investigation of ISP-held data. Specifically, 
drawing on the processes under which the government uses its 
takings power, Congress could enact a statute that creates a 
form of property ownership in the author of certain ISP-held 
data, requires the government to “take” the private data it 
wants, and forces the government to pay the owner just 
compensation for that data. By enabling the government to 
access information that may be important for the protection of 
public safety and welfare while at the same time requiring the 
government to internalize the privacy costs of its investigatory 
activity, and by allowing market prices rather than one-size-fits-
all legislation to determine those costs, taking data has the 
potential to coherently and efficiently protect privacy and the 
public all at once. 
